Patents have a maximum term and cannot be renewed. This is part of the quid pro quo underlying modern patent law. The patentee gets exclusive rights for a limited time but then the technology disclosed in expired patents can be freely used by the public (in at least the jurisdiction that issued the patent). Knowing how to calculate patent term is therefore important in order to determine when a given patent has expired. But, for better or worse, the term of any given patent can vary. There is no single fixed term for all U.S. patents. And the applicable term is not always apparent on the face of a given patent. So how is patent term calculated for U.S. patents?
USPTO Patent Term Calculator
One of the simplest and most practical ways to determine the term of a given U.S. patent is to utilize a patent term calculator provided by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO). Using this downloadable spreadsheet requires inputting certain information about a given patent. Only some of the necessary information appears printed on a granted patent. Other information must be researched in USPTO records, mainly through Patent Center.
The advantage of the USPTO’s patent term calculator is that it can be used by anyone, even people who do not understand the applicable patent laws. However, it still requires ascertaining the correct information to enter in the spreadsheet. That requires knowing where to find such information. The patent term calculator also requires a level of confidence that the correct information is being entered. That is, it still requires knowing some of the terminology so that correct, relevant information is entered.
Read on for more information about the sorts of information relevant to proper patent term calculations.
Relevant Factors
What follows is a more detailed explanation of factors that determine the enforceable term of a given patent. These factors include factors that influence how to calculate a given patent’s term, as well as things that might cut short the enforceable term of a given patent. In any given instance, consulting with a knowledgeable patent attorney is recommend to determine the correct term of any given U.S. patent.
Type of Patent
Paten term first of all depends on the type of patent involved.
U.S. utility and plant patents have a basic term of 20 years from the relevant filing date (35 U.S.C. § 154)—there being some nuance about which filing date is used here.
Timeline Showing Basic Patent Term for U.S. Utility and Plant Patents (Including PCT National Phase Entries)
A priority claim to a foreign patent application (stemming from the Paris Convention or a PCT application that did not designate the USA) or to a prior U.S. provisional patent application does not count against the term (35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(3)). This means a foreign priority or prior provisional filing can effectively extend patent term.
Timeline Showing Basic Patent Term for U.S. Utility and Plant Patents Based on a Prior U.S. Provisional or Foreign Priority Application
For regular PCT national phase entries to the USA, the PCT international filing date is used for term calculation (not the date of later U.S. national phase entry). That is, a PCT international application designating the United States is treated as a U.S. application (see 35 U.S.C. §§ 372 and 375), with the national phase being just a different phase of the same application. So an ordinary national phase entry into the United States does not, by itself, involve a “priority” claim–although there may additionally be a priority claim involved.
The so-called domestic benefit of a prior U.S. non-provisional application (that is, for a continuation, continuation-in-part, or divisional application under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c), including PCT “bypass” applications) does count against patent term, so the term calculation should be based on the earliest such prior filing date. In other words, continuing applications that have priority/domestic benefit of a prior U.S. non-provisional application will have a reduced patent term. The related U.S. application data field (INID code 63) on the face of a patent, if present, can indicate an earlier filing date that may impact term.
Timeline Showing Basic Patent Term for Continuing U.S. Utility and Plant Patents Based on a Prior Domestic U.S. Application (Including PCT “Bypass” Applications)
Example of INID code 63 “Related U.S. Application Data” field on front page of U.S. Pat. No. 11,102,682, showing earliest filing date for patent term calculation of a continuing application
In contrast, U.S. design patents currently have a fixed basic term of 15-years from the date of grant (35 U.S.C. § 173). The filing date issues referenced above do not impact design patent term.
Timeline Showing Basic Patent Term for U.S. Design Patents
Reissue patents are possible “for the unexpired part of the term of the original patent.” (35 U.S.C. § 251). This means that a reissue patent’s term is no longer than the term of the original patent, as subject to any extension or adjustment. It is possible that a reissue patent’s term could be shorter than that of the original patent (see discussion of terminal disclaimers below). But reissue does not lengthen patent term.
Filing Date and Changes in the Law
The laws around patent term have changed over time. Some patents applied for or granted prior to those changes in the law may be subject to a different term.
U.S. utility and plant patents applications filed before June 8, 1995 can have a term of 17 years from the date or grant rather than from the earliest applicable filing date. Any patent that was in force on June 8, 1995 will have a term that is the greater of the 20-year term as discussed above or 17 years from grant (35 U.S.C. § 154(c)).
For U.S. design patents, those issued from design applications filed before May 13, 2015 have a 14-year term from the date of grant (rather than 15-years from grant).
Of course, there may be future changes in the law that affect patent term calculations. And courts may issue decisions that affect the interpretation of laws that impact patent term calculations.
Patent Term Adjustment
Certain delays in examination can lead to an adjustment of patent term for a given original patent (but not for a reissue). This is called patent term adjustment (PTA) under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b). Normally, this PTA is calculated as the number of days beyond the basic 20-year term that the patent can remain in force. The PTA period normally appears on the face of each granted patent—typically in a “Notice” field denoted with an asterisk (*). The USPTO’s Patent Center portal also has a menu tab showing detailed PTA calculations for a given patent. However, it is possible for a patentee to challenge the USPTO’s PTA calculation in some circumstances, meaning the PTA period might be corrected later. PTA does not apply to design patents.
Example of PTA notice on front page of U.S. Pat. No. 10,000,000, showing 430 days of additional patent term
Patent Term Extension
Patentees can potentially obtain patent term extension (PTE) under 35 U.S.C. § 156 based upon premarket regulatory review of certain human drugs, food or color additives, medical devices, animal drugs, and veterinary biological products. This restores some term lost while awaiting premarket government approval from a regulatory agency. An application for PTE must be submitted within sixty (60) days of when permission for commercial marketing or use occurred. Patentees have to affirmatively apply for PTE, which is not automatically granted. Also, PTE is only possible for patents on certain types of subject matter; it does not apply to design or plant patents. § 156 PTE is not indicated on granted patents and must be researched in USPTO records, mainly through Patent Center.
Disclaimers
A given patent may be subject to a disclaimer (35 U.S.C. § 253). The two types of disclaimers are a terminal disclaimer or a statutory disclaimer.
In a terminal disclaimer, the patentee disclaims or dedicates to the public a portion of the term of a given patent. That is, the term of the patent is shortened from what it might otherwise be. Terminal disclaimers are frequently used to overcome double patenting, by disclaiming the period of patent term (if any) that would extend beyond that of one or more other patents. They are also used when design patent applications are revived after abandonment, disclaiming a period of patent term equal to the period of abandonment. Terminal disclaimers do not affect § 156 PTE, however.
Example of terminal disclaimer notice on front page of U.S. Pat. No. 11,102,682
Excerpt from example terminal disclaimer filed against U.S. Pat. No. 11,102,682, disclaiming term beyond that of U.S. Pat. No. 10,667,181
The USPTO has sometimes, but not always, printed an indication that a given patent is subject to a terminal disclaimer on the front page of the patent. But terminal disclaimers can also arise after a patent has been granted. In any event, the duration (and possibly also the existence) of a terminal disclaimer must be researched in the prosecution history of the relevant patent in USPTO records. This can generally be done using the online Patent Center portal and viewing the “Documents & Transactions”. Although the calculation of the disclaimed period may require additional research and analysis. For instance, it may be necessary to calculate the term of one or more other patents or a period of applicant delay for a design patent.
For statutory disclaimers, one or more claims of a patent are effectively surrendered. This means that some claims may no longer be in force, even though other ones might.
Lapse or Expiration for Non-Payment of Maintenance Fees
In order to keep a given U.S. utility or plant patent in force, periodic maintenance fees are required (35 U.S.C. § 41(b)). These are due by four, eight, and twelve years from the grant of the patent. However, there are no maintenance fees required for design patents.
If a maintenance fee is not paid on time, then the patent will lapse or expire. This means that a given patent might no longer be in force even though it has not yet reached its maximum possible term.
What makes lapses/expirations complicated is that the patentee may be able to reinstate (that is, revive) the patent if a maintenance fee payment deadline was missed unintentionally. This may give rise to intervening rights (35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(2)). So, significantly, the expiration or lapse of the U.S. patent due to a missed maintenance fee may not mean the final and absolute end of rights in that patent if late payment is accepted.
Terminology describing this lapses/expiration for non-payment of maintenance fees hasvaried. The USPTO currently tends to use “expiration” but “lapse” is a better term because it differentiates situations where revival is possible from those in which a patent’s term has expired because it has reached its maximum limit.
Invalidation and Cancellation
Patents can be invalidated by courts or cancelled by the USPTO, usually as the result of a challenge by another entity. This can affect all or merely some claims of a patent. Such an adverse ruling (after exhaustion of all rights of appeal) can end or limit rights in the patent short of its maximum possible term. It is necessary to research the existence and status of such an adverse ruling, if any.
Withdrawn Patents
Lastly, some patent numbers have been withdrawn by the USPTO. These were essentially never really patents in the first place, for various reasons, and thus have no term. Although, to complicate matters, the USPTO has also reinstated some previously withdrawn patents.
Laws Vary by Jurisdiction
The discussion above pertains only to U.S. patents. In other countries, laws may differ regarding the calculation of patent term, the availability of supplementary protection certificates, and so on.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
Abstract: This article provides critical analysis of the doctrine of assignor estoppel for patent assignments following the Supreme Court’s Minerva v. Hologic decision, which limited the situations in which the doctrine is available to those that involve a “contradiction” by the assignor that violate norms of “fair dealing”. An overview of the likely abrogation of prior Federal Circuit cases is provided. Although, as explained, there are significant policy disputes that underlie the doctrine that have not been definitively resolved, which will undoubtedly be the subject of dispute in future cases. Also addressed, and questioned, are corollaries and related Federal Circuit precedents involving privity, the effect of purported assignments of future inventions and the role of claim construction to preserve validity defenses. For the latter, an “assignor estoppel donut” is conceptualized to highlight the multiple boundaries involved, of which Minerva’s holding addressed only one. Lastly, an analysis of pragmatic assignment scenarios and potential areas of dispute around them is set forth, in order to inform both assignment drafting and negotiation, on the one hand, and legal disputes over existing assignments, on the other.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
What are the minimum requirements to establish enhanced damages for patent infringement after the passage of the America Invents Act (AIA) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Halo, and what evidence can be presented on this point? Post-Halo cases reveal areas of ambiguity and dispute. Some dispute involves willfulness theories falling close to the line between reckless conduct sufficient to establish willfulness and merely negligent conduct that is not willful. But a lingering ambiguity is how 35 U.S.C. § 298 may exclude from willful patent infringement certain conduct that might be considered reckless—and thus willful—in other areas of tort law. For whatever reason, § 298 has received little attention or treatment, which has even led to decisions contrary to that statutory provision.
A Brief History of Willfulness
Let us begin with some context for how willfulness has evolved in patent law.[i] Damages enhancement is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 284, even though the term “willful” does not explicitly appear there. In the early 1980s, the Federal Circuit established an affirmative duty of due care and an adverse inference of willfulness if the accused infringer did not both obtain advice of counsel and waive privilege to present an advice of counsel defense.[ii] Decades later, the Federal Circuit abolished the adverse inference in Knorr-Bremse.[iii] Then it abolished the affirmative duty of due care in Seagate, substituting a two-prong willfulness analysis requiring “objective recklessness” as a prerequisite.[iv] In the aftermath of those cases, the AIA introduced § 298, which prohibits use of the failure to obtain advice of counsel or make an advice of counsel defense to establish willfulness (or inducement).[v]
In 2016, the Supreme Court in Halo threw out the “objective recklessness” prerequisite, finding its “inelastic constraints” insufficient to allow courts to punish “the full range of culpable behavior.”[vi] The Court held that “culpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct.”[vii] Therefore, “[t]he subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was objectively reckless.”[viii] The Court discussed how reckless conduct supports punitive damages where willful intent is required while merely negligent conduct does not, clarifying that “a person is reckless if he acts ‘knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize’ his actions are unreasonably risky.”[ix] The abrogated “objective recklessness” threshold had allowed classically reckless conduct to be exonerated by after-the-fact rationalizations, which meant that some reckless conduct was inappropriately shielded from punitive enhanced damages.[x]
Later Federal Circuit cases have interpreted Halo as abrogating the “objective recklessness” requirement in a relatively narrow way but leaving intact much other pre-Halo case law,[xi] which presents challenges for anyone trying to parse out the way older cases may have been abrogated only in part but are potentially still controlling as to other aspects. The Federal Circuit has maintained that “willfulness” is a question of intent involving the accused infringer’s state of mind that is for the finder of fact (jury) to decide,[xii] and knowledge of the asserted patent is a prerequisite to a finding of willfulness.[xiii] After willfulness is established, the question of enhancement of damages is then a question for the court (rather than jury) to decide[xiv]—though a willfulness verdict does not automatically entitle the patentee to enhanced damages.[xv] But a court’s discretionary moral judgment regarding enhancement does not depend on any preceding factual finding of a particular state of mind or level of intent of the infringer.[xvi]
District court decisions post-Halo have begun to explore the minimum requirements to plead and then introduce evidence of willfulness, though the Federal Circuit has not yet reached some of the new theories definitively. These various new theories address what it means to subjectively “have reason to know” that accused conduct presents an unreasonable risk of patent infringement in the absence of direct evidence that the accused party actually knew about the patent and that there was a high probability its conduct infringed, as well as the effect of the accused taking affirmative steps to avoid learning of such facts.[xvii]
New Theories of Willful Infringement
First, a number of district courts have found “willful blindness” to be an acceptable theory of willful patent infringement. Motiva from the Eastern District of Texas is perhaps the most widely known of these cases, holding that “[s]ince the Supreme Court has explained that willful blindness is a substitute for actual knowledge in the context of infringement, it follows that willful blindness is also a substitute for actual knowledge with respect to willful infringement.”[xviii] Willful blindness has two basic requirements: (1) the accused must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists, and (2) the accused must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact; these two requirements mean willful blindness has a limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence.[xix] To avoid dismissal, patentees must make “plausible” willfulness allegations regarding both requirements for willful blindness.[xx]
What has generated much discussion about willfulness theories relying on willful blindness is the role of “no patent review” corporate policies that (at least on paper) bar employees from reviewing competitor patents.[xxi] Yet the mere existence of such a “no patent review” policy is not per se sufficient to plead willful blindness for willful infringement unless there is also a plausible allegation that the accused party subjectively believed a high probability of patent infringement existed.[xxii] In practical terms, this means there must be something more than simply a blanket corporate policy that applies to any and all (competitor) patents and that “something more” must plausibly suggest a culpable state of mind with regard to infringement of the asserted patent.
Second, some courts have addressed other theories—distinct from “willful blindness”—that an accused infringer should have reasonably known about the asserted patent. For example, district courts are divided about whether actual knowledge of an unasserted family-related patent coupled with an allegation that the accused should have investigated that patent family to discover the asserted patent—such as a broader continuation or broadening reissue—is sufficient to support willfulness.[xxiii] At times, these other theories appear uncomfortably close to the old, abrogated affirmative duty of due care.[xxiv] These other theories seem less stringent and more expansive than willful blindness, partly because they fall close to the boundary between negligence and recklessness but also because decisions on these theories often contain little or no discussion of why the accused had reason to know that there was infringement of a later-issued patent and not merely reason to know that the later-asserted patent existed.[xxv]
Statutory Limits on Evidence of Willfulness Under § 298
But what about § 298? A curious feature of many post-Halo willfulness cases is how little that section introduced by the AIA is discussed or even cited by courts when dealing with issues to which it directly relates, namely the relevance of evidence under the second Read factor: “whether the infringer . . . investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed.”[xxvi] This is most troubling when courts proffer reasoning based on case law that was abrogated by § 298 (if not also by Seagate). Section 298 states:
“The failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel with respect to any allegedly infringed patent, or the failure of the infringer to present such advice to the court or jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed the patent or that the infringer intended to induce infringement of the patent.”[xxvii]
There can be no question that § 298 excludes certain evidence from use to prove willfulness, including (1) the failure to consult an attorney and (2) the decision to maintain privilege over advice received from counsel. Yet an asymmetrical framework remains: the accused infringer is still free to obtain a legal opinion and later voluntarily present an advice of counsel defense based on that legal advice,[xxviii] but a “decision not to seek an advice-of-counsel defense is legally irrelevant under 35 U.S.C. § 298.”[xxix]
The key effect of § 298’s framework has to be that “having reason to know” for a (recklessness) willfulness theory must be limited to what the accused infringer reasonably should have known at the time without the assistance of counsel. The scope of the accused party’s (subjective) knowledge of the intricacies of patent law will vary considerably, though. For instance, lay parties might reasonably believe that broader later-issuing patents or reissues are not likely or that something like prosecution laches would apply to them.[xxx] This subjective knowledge may be difficult to even infer from circumstantial evidence in situations in which the accused did obtain advice of counsel but chooses not to waive privilege and not to make an advice of counsel defense based on that advice. And mere speculation on this point is generally inadequate. Moreover, as one district court held, attempts to suggest what the accused knew based on privileged communications not in evidence may be improper as a “disguised” attempt to circumvent the limits set forth in § 298.[xxxi] In a somewhat counterintuitive way, § 298 provides two distinct incentives to obtain advice of counsel because an accused party can either waive privilege in such advice and present an advice of counsel defense or maintain privilege and later potentially shield certain state of mind inquiries or inferences implicating that (maintained) privilege.[xxxii]
Does a Duty of Due Care Still Exist? And Does It Matter?
Seagate abrogated the affirmative duty of due care; but when Halo later abrogated the “objective recklessness” standard, a question arose as to the impact of Halo’s abrogation of the abrogation of the duty of due care.[xxxiii] The Federal Circuit has not explicitly weighed in on this point, and no Federal Circuit case since Halo mentions the term “duty of due care” at all. On the one hand, § 298 makes the existence or nonexistence of a judicially created duty of due care less important. But a real question remains about how patentee use of the second Read factor against an accused infringer may now be abrogated in whole or part. Can an accused party’s failure to conduct a nonlegal investigation of some sort regarding an asserted patent be used to establish willfulness today?
Worth mentioning at the outset is the Federal Circuit’s Broadcom case regarding induced infringement. There, despite the abolishment of the duty of due care, “[b]ecause opinion-of-counsel evidence, along with other factors, may reflect whether the accused infringer ‘knew or should have known’ that its actions would cause another to directly infringe, . . . such evidence remains relevant.”[xxxiv] This is not at all straightforward. At first blush, failure to meet an abolished/nonexistent duty of due care hardly seems relevant, logically if not legally. But in any event, the passage of § 298 abrogated precedent like Broadcom with regard to failure to obtain advice of counsel (or to present such a defense).[xxxv] But if the duty of due care only ever pertained to advice of counsel, then its abrogation (by statute or case law) might have left intact some separate due inquiry obligation under the second Read factor.[xxxvi]
Tending to complicate matters here are cases reaching conclusions plainly contrary to § 298, or reaching conclusions as to the boundaries and implications of that section without meaningful explanation. For instance, one district court ruled that “failure to produce . . . an opinion for trial can be considered as a factor in the jury’s determination of willfulness.”[xxxvii] Astoundingly, that court discussed old cases without any reference to their abrogation, and its ruling ended up permitting use of statutorily barred evidence for willfulness.[xxxviii] Moreover, a nonprecedential Federal Circuit decision discussed the second Read factor and found that a lack of investigation of asserted patents provided some evidence of willfulness, reaching that conclusion without discussing legal relevance limits under § 298.[xxxix]
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Halo suggested that a nonlawyer analysis of an asserted patent might be enough to show a lack of willfulness,[xl] though the majority opinion was silent about that scenario. But that very issue came up in a district court case that held a willfulness verdict to be supported by evidence that “years of lucrative infringing sales [occurred] after failing to respond to the . . . licensing letter with a minimally adequate analysis of whether a license would be necessary,” which the court said was not prohibited by § 298 because the jury was instructed to disregard such matters, although the accused did try to present evidence of a nonlawyer invalidity analysis that the court excluded at trial.[xli] This illustrates the problem of courts too often suggesting what is in effect an adverse inference in jury instructions and then trying to immediately unring the bell by stating that no adverse inference of willfulness is permitted.
Yet a contradiction often remains. A more defensible formulation is that a jury’s inferences of knowledge of the asserted patent and of infringement can support a willfulness finding in the absence of countervailing evidence. That is, an accused infringer simply runs a greater risk of a willfulness finding if no advice of counsel defense or the like is pursued to rebut willfulness allegations because a jury can properly infer minimally sufficient knowledge and intent even in the absence of direct evidence on those points, and this does not require going so far as to assign any probative value to a failure to act. There is an important difference between willfulness being inferred from unrebutted circumstantial evidence and the failure to act (e.g., to investigate or seek legal advice) itself being treated as positive evidence of willfulness.
It is fair to distinguish the possibility of the accused making a nonlawyer analysis or inquiry defense to a charge of willfulness from an affirmative duty to do so. On its face, § 298 bars patentees from arguing about failures to obtain or present “advice of counsel” evidence.[xlii] But nothing in the literal text of § 298 bars evidence of a failure to conduct a lay investigation of an affirmative claim of infringement. Yet excluding evidence of nonlawyer investigations or analyses by the accused runs against Justice Breyer’s Halo concurrence, if not also the implicit framework of § 298.
In these senses, the question of what evidence is relevant and what, if any, quasi “duty of due care” investigation/analysis requirement remains under the second Read factor becomes significant. While cases have relied on investigative failures to support willfulness, the reasoning and justifications for such conclusions are often shaky at best or simply stated in a confusing manner. Courts will need to sort this out more definitively. But, for their part, patent litigation counsel need to be more consciously aware of these issues so they can be raised and argued when appropriate.
Key Takeaways
Post-Halo, the Federal Circuit applies a two-step process to claims for enhanced patent infringement damages under § 284: willfulness is initially a question for the finder of fact, and then subsequent enhancement, if any, is at the court’s discretion.
Failure to obtain or present an opinion of counsel cannot be used to prove willfulness, though obtaining an opinion can still be valuable to rebut charges of willful infringement; however, the value or necessity of nonattorney patent infringement and validity investigations is not yet clear.
“Willful blindness” has been accepted by many district courts as a willfulness theory, but at the outset it requires plausible pleadings about the accused’s subjective belief that there was a high probability that the asserted patent both existed and was infringed and that the accused took deliberate actions to avoid learning of those facts; “no patent review” policies may or may not meet all of those requirements.
District courts are divided over whether willfulness can be plausibly supported by a failure to monitor or investigate a patent family after learning about an unasserted patent in that family (in the absence of affirmative avoidance of facts akin to willful blindness).
Relevance limits under § 298 have often been overlooked by courts but should be considered for evidentiary objections and motion practice.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
[ii]. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Where . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing,” including “the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity.”).
[iii]. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“Although there continues to be ‘an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others,’ the failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an opinion would have been unfavorable.” (citation omitted)).
[xiii]. WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1341; see alsoSRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 930 F.3d 1295, 1310 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (when willfulness began is a factual issue).
[xvi]. But questions arise where the Federal Circuit appears to suggest that certain levels of intent can support willfulness but not enhanced damages, which seems contrary to Halo. SeeSRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 14 F.4th 1323, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Austen Zuege, “The Federal Circuit’s Standard for Enhanced Damages,”blue over gray (Oct. 12, 2021). This apparent discrepancy might allow courts to moot a jury’s willfulness finding. SeeSchwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., No. 11-cv-820, slip. op. at 50 (D. Minn. July 30, 2018).
[xix]. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 769–70; Motiva, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 837 (“By definition, willful avoidance requires more than mere recklessness—and Halo holds that recklessness alone is enough to show willful infringement.”).
[xx]. Bos. Sci., 415 F. Supp. 3d at 494–95; Nonend Inventions, N.V. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-466, 2016 WL 1253740, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2016), adopted, No. 2:15-cv-466, 2016 WL 1244973 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2016).
[xxiii]. CompareVasudevan Software, Inc. v. TIBCO Software Inc., No. C 11-06638, 2012 WL 1831543, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2012) (“requisite knowledge of the patent allegedly infringed simply cannot be inferred from mere knowledge of other patents,” such as “the [parent] patent, or, more generally, [the plaintiff’s] ‘patent portfolio’”), andMaxell, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No. 5:19-cv-00036, slip op. at 9-10 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2019) (dismissing willfulness allegation based only on knowledge of application and not ultimately issued patent or knowledge of allowance of application), withSIMO Holdings Inc. v. Hong Kong uCloudlink Network Tech. Ltd., No. 1:18-cv-05427, slip op. at 7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2019) (rejecting Vasudevan), andOxygenator Water Techs., Inc. v. Tennant Co., No. 20-cv-358, slip op. at 8–13 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2020), andSiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., 330 F. Supp. 3d 574, 609 (D. Mass. 2018).
[xxiv]. See, e.g., Schwendimann, No. 11-cv-820, slip. op. at 42 (duty of due care remains abrogated); Biedermann Techs. GmbH & Co. KG v. K2M, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 3d 407, 429 n.17 (E.D. Va. 2021) (noting abrogation issues and not intending to impose duty of due care; allegations were similar to willful blindness).
[xxv]. E.g., Oxygenator Water Techs., No. 20-cv-358, slip op. at 8–13 (passing over willful blindness to find failure to monitor/investigate willfulness theory plausible); Meridian Mfg., Inc. v. C & B Mfg., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 808, 844 (N.D. Iowa 2018). But seeHalo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“‘[W]illful misconduct’ do[es] not mean that a court may award enhanced damages simply because the evidence shows that the infringer knew about the patent and nothing more.”).
[xxxii]. See id. In contrast, enhanced damages were affirmed where the infringer delayed obtaining advice of counsel for years. Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). There, legal advice was (eventually) obtained and privilege waived, but the delay was held against the infringer.
[xxxiv]. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that “failure to procure . . . an opinion [of counsel] may be probative of [subjective] intent”).
[xxxvi]. SeeSRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464–65 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he primary consideration is whether the infringer, acting in good faith and upon due inquiry, had sound reason to believe that it had the right to act in the manner that was found to be infringing.” (emphasis added)). Broadcom is still cited without mentioning its statutory abrogation. Omega Pats., 920 F.3d at 1352–53. Compare Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 699, with35 U.S.C. § 298.
[xxxix]. WCM Inds., Inc. v. IPS Corp., 721 F. App’x 959, 970, 970 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (nonprecedential) (questioning cases suggesting no duty to predict what claims will issue from a pending patent applicable because prosecution histories are now normally publicly available); see alsoSIMO Holdings, No. 1:18-cv-05427, slip. op. at 5–7; 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(d), 284.
[xl]. Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1936 (Breyer, J., concurring); see alsoSchwendimann, No. 11-cv-820, slip. op. at 42–43; Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 699 (D. Del. 2017). But seeSSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (excluding lay testimony of belief in invalidity and noninfringement to rebut willfulness).
Here is a common scenario. Your business is planning to release a new product but wants to avoid infringing anyone else’s IP. What should you do? To avoid infringing anyone else’s IP, you should consider proactive clearance or freedom-to-operate (FTO) efforts, ideally before the new product is commercially launched. Such efforts are not legally mandated but should be tailored to your businesses’ risk tolerance in light of the typical costs of patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret litigation. The scope of these efforts will depend upon the type of IP involved. Specific efforts may also depend on where you are planning to release the product, geographically. The following discussion focuses on the USA.
General Tips
Consider implementing overarching policies and protocols to reduce IP infringement (or misappropriation) risks. Educate and supervise staff accordingly. Do not simply assume that employees will already understand or care about IP infringement and misappropriation risks.
Make reasonable efforts to avoid infringement, including proactive clearance/FTO efforts where appropriate. But accept, as a cost of doing business, that despite those efforts there will always remain some risk that a “troll” will make an IP infringement claim of dubious merit. Failing to make reasonable efforts will just make it easier for others to target you with infringement claims that are expensive to defend.
When making goods or materials at the request of a customer (e.g., private label goods), be cautious of harsh and potentially predatory indemnity or warranty terms in purchase agreements. These can come into play if the customer is requesting infringement—either intentionally or merely negligently—while passing all infringement liability onto your business. You might be agreeing to assume IP infringement risks that far exceed the commercial value of the contract. This is also a concern where infringement liability may depend on customer actions outside your control.
It is also recommended to obtain a business insurance policy with coverage for unintentional trademark and copyright infringement (e.g., “advertising injury” coverage without major exclusions or limiting definitions). However, patent infringement coverage is not found in typical general business policies and is uncommon (because its cost/benefit tradeoff is rarely attractive).
Patents
For patents, the most common type of patent infringement has essentially a strict liability character and infringement does not depend on whether you had actual knowledge of the other party’s patent(s). However, though knowledge and intent (willfulness) can impact damages. Also, indirect infringement—a category of certain types of infringement—may require knowledge of the patent and that your activities infringe.
Consider a pre-launch patent FTO study that initially involves a search for any potentially conflicting patents, followed by a legal analysis. Proactively performing a patent FTO study allows you to find potentially problematic patents before they find you. That makes possible certain risk reduction efforts, such as an opinion of counsel, a design around, seeking a license, etc.
Trademarks
For trademarks, infringement has essentially a strict liability character and infringement does not depend on whether you had actual knowledge of the other party’s trademark. Liability can arise if there is a likelihood of confusion, even in the absence of any actual confusion by consumers. Trademark infringement does not have to be willful to result in a damages award. Also, there is a presumption that a trademark owner can obtain an injunction against use of an infringing mark.
When adopting new branding, it is not unusual for a first-choice mark (and second-choice…) to be already taken by another business. Many marks are already taken by others, which limits the universe of marks freely available for your business’ use at the time of adoption. It may be preferable to select a different mark from the start than to later re-brand, because re-branding tends to become more burdensome, costly, and disheartening as time passes.
Consider a pre-launch trademark clearance that initially involves a search for any potentially conflicting trademarks, followed by a legal analysis. Such a search should encompass all the relevant jurisdictions (e.g., all countries where your brand or mark will be used). Registration is not required to have enforceable trademark rights in the U.S. So a clearance search should ideally assess possible unregistered marks too.
Copyrights
For copyrights, there must be unauthorized copying of protected expression. Though there can be risks from copying that happens through inattention or negligent conduct. Fair use limits the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, but fair use will not always apply (and usually won’t when simply making commercial use of a work rather than making critical commentary about the work). There are many misconceptions about copyright law. For instance, just because something is available on the Internet does not make it “fair game” for your business’ use—even if denoted as being “free” or “royalty free”.
Have an awareness of copyright infringement risks. Also be aware of the ways that employees might commit infringement. For instance, employees posting materials to online platforms under via company accounts can present copyright infringement risks. Consider ways to educate employees about copyright and supervise employee activities.
Perform copyright clearance for any materials that you did not wholly create yourself that you plan to use, and obtain written permission or a license or assignment of ownership. Retain records of written authorizations. And make sure that you adhere to the terms of any license. Also consider seeking an indemnity for any licensed materials, because you could be licensing materials that are themselves infringing.
Trade Secrets
For trade secrets, there must be misappropriation of secret materials. Though there can be risks from misappropriation that happens though inattention or negligent conduct. However, trade secret misappropriation will generally only arise if your business had received secret information from someone else. This could occur by hiring an employee who knows confidential information from a prior employer.
For trade secrets, review any non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in place and consider clean room or other protocols if any confidential materials were or will be received by staff.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
Prosecution history estoppel can arise when the patentee relinquishes subject matter during the prosecution of the patent—that is, during examination of a patent application at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO)—either by amendment or argument. A narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement for patentability (under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112, 161, or 171) may give rise to an estoppel. When it applies, prosecution history estoppel will prevent a patentee from relying on the Doctrine of Equivalents to establish infringement based on the particular equivalents surrendered. A given claim limitation might be given only its literal scope (as properly construed) but no more. This policy allows competitors to rely on prosecution history estoppel to ensure that their own devices/processes will not be found to infringe by equivalence.
The Basic Rule
The Doctrine of Equivalents is an equitable doctrine created by courts long ago. It is premised on language’s inability to capture the essence of innovation, allowing some protection beyond the literal scope of a claim where the claimed invention and the accused product or process are equivalent. Its purpose is to “temper unsparing logic” that “would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form” and it evolved in response to situations where accused infringers attempted to “practice a fraud on a patent” by introducing “minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy.” However, there is a tension between such concerns and the need for patents to put the public on notice of what a patent does and does not cover.
Prosecution history estoppel is about interpreting patent claims by reference to the history that led to their grant. It limits the patentee’s ability to establish infringement by equivalence to help provide certainty to competitors about the enforceable scope of a U.S. patent. Accordingly, the Doctrine of Equivalents is not available where prosecution history shows the inventor was able to capture equivalent differences in words but chose narrower language. The patentee cannot later recapture what was previously surrendered under the guise of the Doctrine of Equivalents. Where the original patent application once embraced the purported equivalent but the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or to protect its validity, the patentee cannot assert that he or she lacked the words to describe the subject matter in question.
Estoppel Can Arise Through Amendment or Argument
Prosecution history estoppel can arise two ways: (1) by making a narrowing amendment to the claim (amendment-based estoppel) or (2) by surrendering claim scope through argument to the patent examiner (argument-based estoppel). These two possibilities are discussed in turn.
How Amendment-Based Estoppel Can Arise
The first way that prosecution history estoppel can arise is by way of a narrowing amendment to a claim during prosecution. The question of what constitutes a narrowing amendment will depend on the context of a particular patent claim. But a classic example is adding words that narrow the limitations of a claim to avoid a prior art reference cited in a rejection in an office action. As another example, which is less intuitive, courts have said rewriting a dependent claim in independent form is an amendment adding a new claim limitation, which constitutes a narrowing amendment that may give rise to an estoppel.
How Argument-Based Estoppel Can Arise
Argument-based estoppel arises when the prosecution history evinces a “clear and unmistakable” surrender of subject matter. Argument-based estoppel most often arises when the patentee tries to convince a patent examiner that the claims of an application recite something different from the prior art. For instance, a patentee may have argued that a claim term has a meaning that is narrow enough to avoid a disclosure or teaching in a cited prior art reference. In such a situation, the patentee will likely be estopped from later asserting that the Doctrine of Equivalents encompasses what was previously argued to be outside the scope of the claimed invention. Such arguments are treated like an acknowledgement that the patentee knew the meaning of the claim language and deliberately chose narrower language in order to obtain a patent.
Scope of the Estoppel
Though prosecution history estoppel can bar a patentee from challenging a wide range of alleged equivalents used by competitors, its reach requires examination of the particular subject matter surrendered. Even where prosecution history estoppel applies, the scope of the estoppel is not always absolute. These inquiries differ somewhat between amendment-based estoppel and argument-based estoppel.
Scope of Amendment-Based Estoppel
The scope of amendment-based estoppel depends on the claim language at issue and the reason for the amendment. For instance, where the reason for the amendment was not related to avoiding the prior art, it does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that element. But an amendment to clarify the recitation of the claimed invention to satisfy definiteness requirements for patentability would give rise to an estoppel, even though there was no prior art reference prompting the change. Also, cancellation of a claim can give rise to estoppel with regard to any claim(s) that remain (or are added). However, the reason for an amendment is often not clear from the prosecution history.
When no explanation for an amendment is provided, there is a rebuttable presumption that the Doctrine of Equivalents is not available at all. When the purpose underlying a narrowing amendment cannot be determined—and hence the rationale for limiting the estoppel to surrender of only particular equivalents—it is presumed that the patentee surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower language. But that presumption of amendment-based estoppel can be overcome for a particular equivalent when (1) the equivalent in question was unforeseeable at the time of the application, (2) rationale underlying the amendment bears no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question, or (3) the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.
Scope of Argument-Based Estoppel
The scope of argument-based estoppel is based on the scope of particular arguments made during prosecution. Unlike amendment-based estoppel, there is no presumption-and-rebuttal approach. Rather, the question is how far argument-based estoppel applies in the first place, if at all. The question is whether there was a clear and unmistakable argument-based surrender of particular subject matter. Courts have said that simple arguments and explanations to the patent examiner do not surrender an entire field of equivalents. But any arguments can still surrender some equivalents, even if they do not surrender all possible equivalents. This is very context-dependent. The key to this inquiry is whether a competitor would reasonably believe that the patentee’s argument had surrendered the relevant subject matter.
However, courts have said that any clear assertions made during prosecution in support of patentability, whether or not those assertions were actually required to secure allowance of a claim, may still create an argument-based estoppel. Also, once an argument is made regarding a claim term that creates an estoppel, that estoppel will apply to that term in other claims in the patent too.
Prosecution Disclaimer
Prosecution disclaimer is a separate but related concept. Rather than relating to the availability of the Doctrine of Equivalents to establish infringement, prosecution disclaimer or disavowal can limit the proper construction of a claim’s literal scope. Thus, it may affect whether or not literal infringement is found—prior to any consideration of the Doctrine of Equivalents. For example, it can arise when a patentee makes arguments during prosecution about how the pending claims differ from the prior art. This is meant to prevent patentees from opportunistically taking different (and broader) positions in court when asserting infringement than when obtaining the patent in the first place. Statements made during the prosecution of family-related applications, even later-filed ones and foreign counterparts, may sometimes result in prosecution disclaimer as well.
Questions about prosecution disclaimer pertain to proper claim construction. Claim terms are presumed to carry their full and customary meaning unless the patentee unequivocally imparted a novel meaning to those terms either in the patent application itself (called acting as her own lexicographer) or expressly relinquished claim scope during prosecution. Just as with argument-based estoppel, prosecution disclaimers must be “clear and unmistakable” in order to limit claim scope. An ambiguous statement during prosecution will not limit a claim term’s ordinary meaning.
An important difference between prosecution disclaimer and prosecution history estoppel is when they are taken into account. Prosecution disclaimer is a matter of claim construction. That is something courts do as a first step in patent infringement analyses, without reference to the specific product or process accused of infringement. In contrast, the Doctrine of Equivalents is bound up with the subsequent comparison of the accused product or process to the asserted patent claims as properly construed. Prosecution history estoppel is a question of whether a patent owner is permitted to invoke the Doctrine of Equivalents in particular ways in the second part of infringement analysis, after claim construction. But if literal infringement is found—despite any prosecution disclaimer—there is no need to reach the Doctrine of Equivalents.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
At a most basic level, patent infringement in the U.S. involves making, using, selling, offering for sale, importing into the USA a patented invention without authorization. Although there are some additional grounds for infringement that may apply in some other circumstances. All grounds for infringement fall into two general categories: direct infringement and indirect infringement. These categories refer to who is being accused and whether they are directly responsible or instead indirectly or partly responsible. There are multiple types of infringement under each category. These include literal or Doctrine of Equivalents infringement, and, for indirect infringement, active inducement of infringement, contributory infringement, and certain activities related to components for export from the USA. Each of these provisions, set forth in § 271 of the U.S. patent laws, is taken up further below.
Direct Infringement
Direct patent infringement means that an accused party is directly responsible for infringement a patent. Direct infringement requires that each and every limitation (or element) of at least one claim of an asserted patent is met either literally or under the Doctrine of Equivalents. If a limitation of a given patent claim is not present in the accused product or process, either literally or equivalently, then that claim is not infringed.
The sorts of things that can constitute direct infringement include the following:
making (that is, manufacturing) the patented invention in the USA (35 U.S.C. § 271(a))
submitting a new drug application for U.S. regulatory approval (Hatch-Waxman Act; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e))
importing into the USA, or offering to sell, selling, or using within the USA, a product which is made outside the USA by a process patented in the USA, unless it is materially changed by subsequent processes or it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product (35 U.S.C. § 271(g))
Certain additional rights to exclude specific to plant patents (35 U.S.C. § 163)
There are two ways of finding infringement that differ in terms of how the accused product or process relates to the scope of the claim(s) of the asserted patent:
Literal Infringement
Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents (also called infringement by equivalence)
Literal Infringement
Literal infringement means that the accused product or process falls within the scope of the asserted claim(s) as construed by a court. Under U.S. law, infringement analysis is a two-step process. It involves, first, construing the claims to ascertain their meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art and to resolve any ambiguities or disputes over that meaning, and, second, comparing the accused product/process to the properly construed claim(s). Literal infringement is present when the accused infringer meets each and every limitation (or element) of an asserted patent claim exactly, as properly construed. Any deviation from a claim limitation (as properly construed) precludes a finding of literal infringement.
Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless still be found to infringe if there is “equivalence” between the elements of the accused product or process and claimed elements of the patented invention. This type of infringement arises when the accused product or process is outside the literal scope of at least one limitation of an asserted claim, as properly construed. Patentees rely on the Doctrine of Equivalents under the second step of the infringement analysis, if at all, only if literal infringement cannot be established. Otherwise, the Doctrine of Equivalents can apply to the same set of activities as for literal infringement.
This is an equitable doctrine meant to “temper unsparing logic” that “would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form.” It evolved in response to situations where accused infringers attempted to “practice a fraud on a patent” by introducing “minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy.” Of course, the doctrine is in tension with the policy requiring that claims put the public on notice of a patent’s scope. This is a reason the Doctrine of Equivalents is not meant to be routinely invoked and is not applied broadly. In other words, this type of infringement is a limited exception to the general rule that patent claims must reasonably put others on notice of the outermost boundaries of what constitutes infringement. Put another way, it allows a limited form of “central” claim enforcement in a regime of “peripheral” claiming.
The Doctrine of Equivalents is applied individual claim limitations rather than to the claimed invention as a whole. To find infringement, each claim limitation (or element) must be found either literally or equivalently in the elements of accused product/process. This is called the “all elements” rule. The question of equivalence is inapplicable if a claim limitation is totally missing from an accused device. The Doctrine of Equivalents cannot be used to re-draft claims and effectively eliminate limitations entirely. Though this inquiry always revolves around what differences can reasonably be considered equivalent. An undue expansion of a patent’s claim(s) is not permitted. After-arising technology can potentially be encompassed by the Doctrine of Equivalents (unlike for means-plus-function equivalents).
There are two approaches to assessing equivalents: the “insubstantial differences” test and the “function-way-result” test. The function-way-result test (also called the “triple identity” test) says that equivalence may be present for a given element if the accused product/process performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way with substantially the same result. This is not the only way to assess whether differences are insubstantial, but it is particularly useful for certain types of inventions such as mechanical devices. For biochemical inventions, however, looking at substantial differences may sometimes be more appropriate than the function-way-results test.
There are numerous limits on the Doctrine of Equivalents, which are really beyond this basic introduction. But an extremely important limit on the availability of the Doctrine of Equivalents is prosecution history estoppel. Things that the patentee did or said when obtaining the asserted patent might limit the patentee’s ability to later rely on the Doctrine of Equivalents. So the Doctrine of Equivalents is not always or automatically available.
Indirect Infringement
Indirect patent infringement means that an accused party is causing or enabling someone else to infringe. It can apply when an accused infringer meets some but not all of the limitations (or elements) of an asserted patent claim. It includes three types of infringement, which differ in terms of what the accused indirect infringer is doing:
Supplying Component for Export for Combination Outside the USA (35 U.S.C. § 271(f))
Generally speaking, there are additional requirements that must be satisfied to establish indirect infringement that are not required for direct infringement. Those additional requirements vary depending on what type of indirect infringement is asserted.
Also, relevant limitations of asserted claim(s) can be assessed under either their literal scope or under the Doctrine of Equivalents, if available—see discussions above of literal and Doctrine of Equivalents infringement for direct infringement. This is really to say that the Doctrine of Equivalents may still apply to indirect infringement scenarios.
Active Inducement of Infringement
Actively inducing someone else to infringe a patent constitutes inducement of infringement. Specifically, “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” (35 U.S.C. § 271(b)). This is a form of vicarious liability. Active inducement requires taking an affirmative steps to encourage infringement by another entity, as well as knowledge that the encouraged acts infringe the asserted patent. A key component of inducement is that it requires there be at least one direct infringer. But the difference here is that instead of suing the direct infringer, a different entity is sued for inducement.
Inducement commonly arises in situations involving claims to a method of using a product. Rather than sue the end user, which may be a potential customer, the patentee instead sues a competitor making and selling products used by others to (directly) perform and infringe the asserted method claim(s). It also sometimes arises where a corporate officer or owner induces his or her company to infringe, making that individual personally liable for infringement.
Contributory Infringement
Contributory infringement arises when selling, offering to sell, or importing components that are specially made or adapted for use to infringe a patent. However, contributory infringement excludes activities involving a staple article or commodity of commerce that is suitable for substantial noninfringing use. A “substantial noninfringing use” is any use that is not unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, occasional, aberrant, or experimental. So there is normally no liability for selling general-purpose commodities, even if they could be used in making or using a patented invention.
“(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”
In order for contributory infringement to be present, the infringer must know that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented and infringing. This knowledge requirement differentiates contributory infringement from direct infringement, which does not require any such knowledge of the patent or infringement (except to enhance damages).
Contributory infringement is important for situations involving the sale of repair or replacement parts for use in or with patented products or methods.
Supplying Component for Export for Combination Outside the USA
Section 271(f) of the patent laws creates two grounds for infringement involving activities in the USA relating to products made in a foreign country. They arise when components of a patented invention are supplied for export from the USA. These grounds for infringement are similar to yet distinct from active inducement and contributory infringement, discussed above. But these provisions do not require that the equivalent of “foreign” direct infringement occur. That is, the actual combination need not actual occur. However, these provisions apply exclusively to apparatus claims, and are not available for method/process claims. They also do not apply to activities that occur entirely outside the USA. Also, § 271(f)(1) has a quantitative requirement about the number of components involved and it does not apply to only a single component.
“(f)
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.”
The grounds for infringement under § 271(f) are somewhat rarely invoked. This is largely because manufacturing costs are often higher in the USA than abroad. As a result, courts have not extensively clarified the scope and proper application of these provisions. But suffice it to say they may apply in situations where components are being produced and/or sold in the USA for export.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
There are many situations where it is desirable to challenge the validity or patentability of a granted patent or pending patent application. For instance, an invalidity search can be useful for an invalidity opinion to mitigate infringement liability, an invalidity defense in litigation, a proactive challenge to patentability at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), or a pre-issuance submission (observations) to try to restrict or prevent a patent from being issued. But what is the best timing for such an invalidity search?
In one sense, an invalidity search is never strictly legally required. Though, practically speaking, invalidity searches are often crucial to avoiding or reducing liability for patent infringement in many contexts. These searches must be performed in a timely manner to obtain the greatest value from them. That includes performing searches in time to meet deadlines that require having suitable search results available.
Patent invalidity searches are reactive in the sense of being conducted in response to some infringement risk arising. That could be the receipt of a cease & desist letter, the filing of an infringement lawsuit against you, or other knowledge of a potentially problematic patent (e.g., via a freedom-to-operate study). In any event, an invalidity search requires first knowing which patent is the subject of the invalidity search. That is because an invalidity search depends on the scope of the particular claim(s) of concern and their effective filing date(s)—including any priority date(s).
It is a best practice to consider an invalidity search after a tangible risk of patent infringement comes to your attention. Knowledge of a patent coupled with a reasonable belief that infringement might be present can potentially give rise to enhanced damages for infringement. And knowledge of a pending patent application can potentially give rise to so-called “provisional rights” to pre-issuance infringement damages.
There may be deadlines that determine when invalidity search results are needed. For instance, in patent litigation in a district court, the court will issue a scheduling order that often sets a deadline to set for invalidity contentions. In is necessary to have search results available in order to formulate those invalidity contentions and prepare a suitable report. Other times, invalidity contentions might be requested through discovery requests, such as interrogatories. Either way, it is crucial to perform the invalidity search far enough in advance of such deadlines to allow for subsequent legal analysis of the search results.
Moreover, there are situations where a proactive challenge to a granted patent is desired. Proceedings such as inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), oppositions, and the like may have various different deadlines by which a challenge must be filed. Such deadlines drive the timeline for completing invalidity searching. Just as in litigation, the search must be completed with time to spare to allow for legal analysis and preparation of any formal filing papers for the patent challenge, which may require considerable effort to prepare. Additionally, a pre-issuance submission (or observation) might be filed against a pending patent application and there likewise are both formal and practical deadlines to do so.
Lastly, if an opinion of counsel setting forth grounds for liability is desired to mitigate potential infringement damages, such an opinion should ideally be obtained before your relevant product (or process) is commercially launched. If patent in question is discovered only later, then such an opinion should be obtained without unreasonable delay. Having invalidity search results is a prerequisite to completing an invalidity opinion.
In all these possible settings, it is common for multiple invalidity searches to be performed. That can include follow-on invalidity searches performed in an iterative manner, in order to exhaustively locate prior art and to try to obtain sufficient prior art for desired (and reasonable) invalidity arguments as those arguments evolve and develop. It may also include searches performed by different searchers in different databases (including in non-patent literature databases), in different native languages, though investigation of prior public use and on-sale activities, and the like.
Have an invention you would like to patent? Have a brand you would like to register as a trademark? Concerned about infringing someone else’s intellectual property? Is someone else infringing your IP? Need representation in an IP dispute? Austen is a patent attorney / trademark attorney who can help. These and other IP issues are his area of expertise. Contact Austen today to discuss.
If you have decided to perform a freedom-to-operate (FTO) or “clearance” study to try to reduce the risk of patent infringement, it will be necessary to determine when a patent search should be performed. This is a question about best practices for the timing of patent FTO/clearance searches.
The following timeline provides an overview of major timing considerations and the best time to conduct a patent FTO study.
In general, the ideal time to conduct at FTO search is before a product (or technical process/service) is commercially launched but after its technical design parameters are sufficiently established to know what the search should encompass. That is a window of time in between an initial business case and the beginning of research & development (R&D) efforts, on the one hand, and the formal product launch on the other. Additionally, the FTO search and accompanying legal analysis should be completed well enough in advance of the product’s commercial launch date to allow time for possible risk mitigation efforts before infringement liability might start to arise. If the FTO search uncovers a potentially problematic patent, you gain the most benefit from that information if you have allowed time to take responsive action before a product launch point-of-no-return.
In this context, a product launch can be anything that is potentially actionable as patent infringement, including making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing an infringing product in or into the USA. Though product launch infringement risks tend to be greatest when there is a major commercial release that makes the product (or process) widely publicly available, as opposed to mere preparatory efforts (such as prototyping) that might happen only on a private and confidential basis.
Having technical design parameters that are sufficiently established to know what the search is important. This allows the FTO searcher to understand what, specifically, should be searched—and what is excluded from the scope of the search. This process of determining what to search is referred to as “feature identification” (or sometimes “product decomposition”). This involves itemizing individual patent-sized technical features present in the product that are to be searched. But feature identification is only possible if there is sufficient technical information available. If R&D efforts are still in preliminary stages, or if there is really only a (non-technical) business case available, it may not be feasible to conduct an FTO search yet, or at least not for all planned product features. In those situations, a more generalized “landscape” search is perhaps more appropriate. Otherwise, the FTO search(es) for insufficiently-developed feature(s) may need to await further technical R&D.
Updates?
After an FTO search is completed, there are various reasons why a later “update” search may be helpful. First of all, there is generally a delay of roughly eighteen (18) months between the filing and publication of most patent applications—and sometimes longer. This means that there may be relevant pending (but unpublished) patent applications that cannot be found during an initial FTO search. But, additionally, there may be changes to the technical design of planned or released product over time that merit further FTO searching and/or analysis. So, at what time(s) should such FTO search updates be performed? There are actually multiple possible approaches.
Discrete FTO Updates
A first approach is to perform one or more discrete FTO updates that resemble the initial FTO search and analysis. The timing of such discrete updates can be based on product- or technology-based milestones and/or calendar- or timeline-based milestones.
A typical product/technology milestone would be the release of a new or different version of a given product that has new, improved, or simply different features and functionality. An example would be releasing version 1.1 or 2.0 of a product that was previously cleared for its version 1.0 design only. Another typical product/technology milestone would be the occurrence of a particular pre-release design review phase. Technologies that have relatively long development cycles sometimes go through formalized design review processes with multiple distinct phases. In each phase changes to the product design might be introduced. For instance, a given initial product design might work well in prototype form but later be discovered to be too difficult to manufacture efficiently and thus might be replaced with a more easily manufactured design that was not previously searched.
An example of a calendar-based milestone would be to simply conduct a search update on a set periodic cycle, such as every year, or a single time after 18 months have passed since the original FTO search. There is no right or wrong update time period here, or even an particular appropriate number of updates. This is really a trade-off between the burden and expense of each update and the infringement risks likely raised, including the density of ongoing patenting on relevant technologies. Though recall that unpublished pending patent applications might first become available 18 months (or more) after the original FTO search.
Ongoing Monitoring
It is also possible to conduct ongoing monitoringof all patents and published applicationsfor:
particular competitor(s)
particular technology area(s)
Ongoing monitoring can be facilitated through the use of alerts/saved criteria set up with proprietary search platforms or, alternatively, periodic (manual) searches. Such ongoing monitoring can take place in addition to or in place of other milestones or criteria for an FTO search. The main decision points with respect to ongoing monitoring are when to start and when to stop monitoring, and the scope regarding which competitor(s) and/or technology area(s) are included. Those factors are often highly influenced by the time and resource commitments required, as well as the relevance of those efforts to planned or ongoing commercial activities. It is worthwhile to periodically revisit the parameters for ongoing patent monitoring efforts, to ensure that those efforts are still relevant and appropriately focused.
Have an invention you would like to patent? Have a brand you would like to register as a trademark? Concerned about infringing someone else’s intellectual property? Is someone else infringing your IP? Need representation in an IP dispute? Austen is a patent attorney / trademark attorney who can help. These and other IP issues are his area of expertise. Contact Austen today to discuss.
Obtaining an opinion of counsel is a way to help defend yourself in a later patent infringement dispute. In the most general sense, opinions help demonstrate that you acted in good faith at the time. In court, an opinion can be used for an advice of counsel defense against charges of active inducement of infringement or willful infringement, and to rebut demands to pay the other side’s attorney fees because the case is “exceptional”. A finding that infringement was willful can lead to enhanced damages (up to 3x). And the patentee’s attorneys fees can be considerable. So an opinion can help limit exposure.
Opinions are not required. By statute, failure to obtain an opinion of counsel, or to rely on one at trial, cannot be used against the accused infringer to prove willfulness or inducement. It is up to an accused infringer to decide if the burden of obtaining an opinion is worthwhile or not. So the real question become: what circumstances make an opinion worthwhile? Below is a summary of some factors to consider when deciding if you should get an opinion. There are grouped into three categories, though the categories do overlap.
In the end, many of these factors are about whether your conduct might be seen (after-the-fact) as having been reckless and therefore unreasonably risky, with an opinion representing the best way to show that your intent was reasonable at the time. More generally, obtaining an opinion can be a key component of overall efforts to develop and implement strategically beneficial legal positions going forward.
Elevated Exposure Risk Factors
Certain circumstances present elevated exposure risks when it comes to patent infringement. In other words, some circumstances make a patent lawsuit more likely or more costly if you lose. These factors include:
You received a cease & desist or licensing letter from the patentee
The potential amount of (enhanced) damages is high, such as from high-volume sales
The potential amount of attorney’s fee award is high, such as if both sides are inclined to fight to the end rather than settle
There is a particularly high chance of a lawsuit; for instance:
the patent owner is a direct competitor in a highly competitive industry
the patent owner is litigious or has been suing many others in your industry for infringement
you have a history of disputes with the patent owner, even if not necessarily about patents
the patent owner sued you for infringement in another jurisdiction
the patent owner is a former vendor you broke ties with to make a similar product yourself
you hired away an inventor-employee from the patent owner to work on a competing product
you recently won over a customer, contract, or bid from the patentee
You believe there is a high probability the patentee will sue and seek a preliminary injunction
Factors Relating to Particular Defenses
Various patent infringement defenses depend on the accused infringer’s state of mind. But many legal questions surrounding patent infringement are complicated. A written opinion by competent legal counsel documents a defense so that it is clear later on that the investigation and legal analysis were sufficient to reasonably rely on. In other words, it makes clear that your defense was not conclusory, superficial, based on inaccurate information, biased, exaggerated, conjured up after-the-fact, or unreasonable. These factors include:
You want to completely avoid liability for inducement of infringement based on non-infringement (lack of scienter); this often applies when another entity such as a customer or end-user performs steps of a method claim using your product
You want to rely on an invalidity or unenforceability defense; it is almost never reasonable to rely on the invalidity or unenforceability of an asserted patent without an opinion of counsel because those defenses usually involve complex legal and factual issues, and because patents are presumed valid and overcoming that presumption carries a high burden of proof in court
Your non-infringement position relies on a particular claim interpretation (rather than the unambiguous and uncontroversial absence of a claim element under its plain and ordinary meaning); for instance:
non-infringement rests on the interpretation of a “means-plus-function” claim limitation
non-infringement relies upon a claim interpretation citing dictionaries, technical treatises, or other extrinsic evidence
you want to rely on something in the prosecution history to inform claim interpretation, such as a prosecution disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope
you believe the patent owner disclaimed or disavowed something in the patent or acted as his or her “own lexicographer” to define a claim term in a particular way
differences between products within the claimed technology area are extremely complex, nuanced, or counter-intuitive in general, making proper interpretation prone to error
the claims would be difficult for an ordinary juror to understand on their face
Your non-infringement position relies on complex indirect (contributory) infringement, extraterritoriality, or permissible repair issues; for instance, your position implicates the repair/reconstruction doctrine for non-staple-of-commerce goods, implicates manufacturing processes performed abroad on goods later imported, or implicates split or divided infringement issues for method/process claims
The doctrine of equivalents is a concern; that is, you want to rule out a plausible infringement theory under the doctrine of equivalents where there is no prosecution history estoppel, or you want to confirm that prosecution history estoppel applies to a crucial claim element
Business and Reputational Factors
Other relevant factors are less about the legal basis for defenses but instead have to do with business relationships, company policies, practicalities of technology, and marketplace considerations. These factors include:
An opinion can evaluate the effectiveness of a “design-around” that changed your planned product configuration to avoid infringement; in other words, the opinion is the culmination of more wide-ranging efforts to avoid infringement
You want to document your position so that you can better stick to it despite changes in company personnel, corporate mergers, etc.; this also includes documenting your position to avoid unwittingly undoing efforts to “design-around” a patent with subsequent product changes (possibly years later when the reasons for the design-around are nearly forgotten)
An opinion can help convey technical and legal issues to corporate leaders and decision-makers who lack a deep understanding of the technology or patent law
Having obtained an opinion of counsel can help provide comfort and a confidence boost to executives and employees who would likely be called to testify in an infringement lawsuit
You signed a contract that requires you to obtain an opinion of counsel
You offer an indemnity to a customer, distributor, etc. and want to limit exposure for those others’ activities (which may not be entirely within your control)
You want to tell customers, distributors, business partners, or investors that you obtained an opinion, in order to reassure them (while withholding the substantive opinion to preserve privilege)
Establishing a regular policy of obtaining opinions when aware of infringement risks as concrete evidence of a general good faith posture regarding competitor and other 3rd party patents; it may even be what you would expect others to do if your own patent was at issue
Obtaining an opinion can allow for risk mitigation without limiting action to the most conservative legal position; that is, an opinion can help legal counsel or a legal department devise an acceptable path forward and avoid a reputation for saying “no” to too many business proposals
You want to limit liability of individual corporate executives or directors in their personal capacity, including for inducing infringement by the corporation or in piercing the corporate veil scenarios
Parting Remarks About Opinions
Opinions of counsel may not be legally required but obtaining them is often still worthwhile. They can provide great evidence to present to a judge or jury in defense against infringement allegations. That is especially the case when relying on an invalidity argument or a particular claim interpretation. Having an opinion provides a fall-back position so that if you are found to infringe you (hopefully) don’t have to also pay punitive damages or the patentee’s attorney’s fees. A non-infringement opinion can also potentially avoid any and all liability for inducement of infringement (if applicable). But any opinion really needs to be in writing and be prepared by competent outside counsel in order to have the best chance of being effective in those respects. Seriously consider obtaining an opinion whenever a potentially problematic patent comes to your attention.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
A version of this article appeared in AIPLA’s InnovateMagazine in October 2021.
Introduction — Avoiding Copyright Infringement and Ownership Disputes
Mark Twain observed that “[o]nly one thing is impossible for God: to find any sense in any copyright law on the planet.”[i] From the standpoint of individuals and small businesses, Twain’s observation might ring true. Not only do some people have difficulty distinguishing between what they feel copyright law ought to entail and what it actually does entail, there are many genuinely ambiguous and confusing copyright issues that arise from everyday practices. What follows is a collection of observations about a few common copyright infringement pitfalls, meant as a practical reference for those who wish to avoid finding themselves embroiled in an avoidable copyright dispute.
“Free” Materials
“Free” photo and clipart websites and similar archives are used at your own risk. Unless provided with full indemnity, which usually is not provided, ordinary users are liable for infringement if the “free” image website did not actually have permission to use and distribute the image(s) in question. Put another way, just because a web site claims to grant free use of images that appear on the site does not mean that the site operators actually have the authority to grant such permission for a given image—the site operator or whoever uploaded an image to the site might be an infringer. In some instances, there may even be reason to suspect that the alleged owner is aware of the presence of materials in a “free” repository—or was even responsible for placing the materials there—and seeks settlements in bad faith or through outright fraud.[ii]
Will an “innocent infringer” defense help in these situations? Not against liability. Though it potentially limits statutory damages.[iii] How much it might limit statutory damages is discretionary, it may not limit actual damages,[iv] and it will not prevent an injunction. In pragmatic terms, innocent infringement defenses do very little in the face of nuisance settlement demands from copyright owners engaged in troll-like enforcement activities.
“Creative Commons” (CC) licenses are another area where materials turn out to be less usable than believed. There are different types of CC licenses and a given work subject to one kind of CC license may not permit your intended use, especially if your use is “commercial” in nature. And, as discussed below, removal of copyright management information (CMI) from CC works is still a potential source of liability.
Moreover, even where a copyright owner freely grants use of a particular image, if it is an image of a person or derivative of another work—like a photo of a sculpture, painting/mural, clothing design, etc.—then separate authorization or release of a right of publicity/privacy (a so-called model release) for the depicted person or copyright authorization for the depicted work may still be required. Very likely any such additional authorization(s) must be sought from a different person or entity.
Licensing Stock Images
Many stock image providers offer what seem like intentionally confusing licenses. “Royalty free” images (and music) are not actually free but rather are usually subject to lump sum license payments—advertisements about the provider’s license terms may be confusing if not outright misleading. Many stock image providers also offer different types of licenses that are difficult to differentiate. For instance, the least expensive types of stock image licenses often do not cover use for “merchandising”, use on more than a specified number of hard copies, use with video production budgets over a certain threshold, etc. Understanding which type of license addresses your particular intended use may not be simple. Yet, if you purchase an incorrect license you may find yourself in the position of having made an unlicensed use.
Lastly, stock image providers may not offer indemnity or, if they do, it might be provided at levels well below statutory damage maximums.[v] Therefore, if you license an image only to later discover that the image provider was not authorized to license that image you could find yourself in a lawsuit with a monetary exposure that may exceed your apparent culpability.
Outside Contractors and Ownership
You need a written assignment to own copyright in outside contractors’ work. This holds even when an outside contractor was specifically hired to create copyrightable works, such as advertising copy, software code, photos, videos, etc. While “works made for hire” are initially owned by the employer, absent a written agreement to the contrary,[vi] that ownership provision only applies when the work is created by an employee within the scope of his or her job duties or if there is a written work-made-for-hire agreement and the work falls within nine statutory categories of works (and, chances are, it probably does not fall in one of those categories).[vii] In single-member LLCs and similar small businesses where the owner’s status as an “employee” may be in doubt under agency law, and there is no employment or other applicable agreement in place to clarify, then the ownership of copyrights created by such a person may be subject to dispute at some point.
Outside vendors, like marketing companies, will sometimes have service agreements with their customers stating that the customer will own all of the work product, but such language may be phrased in the future tense, which is generally not sufficient to constitute an assignment of copyright—in such cases only a contractual obligation to assign has been established and an additional written assignment is required for the customer to actually obtain ownership of particular copyrights, though this may vary under state law.[viii]
Failure to own a copyright prevents enforcement against infringers. So, if a business hires an outside photographer to take photos for the business’ web site, if a competitor copies any of them the business may find that it does not own the copyrights in the photos and therefore cannot assert infringement until ownership is secured.
DMCA Takedowns
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) includes a “safe harbor” notice-and-takedown provision in 17 U.S.C. § 512.[ix] Takedowns can be powerful tools against online piracy but can also be abused or misused. There are also known scams involving infringers of a copyright using takedown notices to seek nuisance settlements from third parties (who may be protected by fair use) and allegations of usage to silence critics.
CMI, Circumvention, and Repair Issues
Liability for knowing removal or alteration of copyright management information (CMI) is set forth under 17 U.S.C. § 1202. CMI includes the title, author or copyright owner names, and terms and conditions for use. While the law requires removal to be knowing, rather than unwitting or unintentional, and further requires knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that doing so will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement, copyright owners sometimes broadly assert CMI removal to seek additional damages or as a fallback position when substantive infringement claims are unavailable.[x]
Section § 1201 limits “circumvention” of a technological measure that effectively controls access to a copyrighted work, unless the Library of Congress grants an exception. Product/repair manuals, error code outputs generated by diagnostic tools, and/or diagnostic tools themselves may be subject to anti-circumvention restrictions stemming from copyright, which can impact the ability to repair a purchased item. Aside from Section 1201 anti-circumvention exemptions, state right to repair law may provide some counterbalance.
End user license agreements (EULAs) also bridge copyright law and contract law and attempt to circumvent the first sale doctrine (more generally, exhaustion of rights). They may limit or prevent the use of unauthorized repair sources or transfer/resale, even if the enforceability of such EULA terms might be questioned in some jurisdictions.
Predatory Contracts
Finally, buyers sometimes request products from vendors while specifying product requirements (e.g., a fabric pattern or decorative image, included text or video) for which the buyer may not have rights. That is, the buyer may be requesting an infringing knock-off product without explicitly saying so—and possibly without realizing that copyright infringement is being requested. All liability for copyright infringement may nonetheless be placed on the vendor by a purchase agreement, including a buyer indemnification that overrides the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).[xi] Such agreements might be called predatorycontracts where they give the appearance of an opportunity for the vendor when, at bottom, they are really vendor liabilities and the buyer is shifting a greater risk to the vendor than the value of the contract.
Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.
[iv] Actual damages may be low or difficult to establish. See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 165 (2d Cir. 2001); Gregerson v. Vilana Fin., Inc., No. 0:06-cv-01164, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11727, *14-15 (D. Minn., Feb. 15, 2008).
[viii] E.g., TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 2019); cf. IpVenture, Inc. v. Prostar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (interpreting “agree to assign” as requiring subsequent written instrument to effectuate assignment of patent rights).
[x] See, e.g., Philpot v. WOS, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-00339, 2019 WL 1767208 (W.D. Tex. April 22, 2019); Mango v. BuzzFeed, Inc., 970 F. 3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2020) (A plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the existence of CMI in connection with a copyrighted work; and (2) that a defendant distributed works or copies of works; (3) while knowing that CMI has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law; and (4) while knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know that such distribution will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement.); Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc.,899 F.3d 666, 673-75 (9th Cir. 2018) (there are two scienter requirements and for the second the copyright owner “must provide evidence from which one can infer that future infringement is likely, albeit not certain, to occur as a result of the removal or alteration of CMI” “such as by demonstrating a past ‘pattern of conduct’ or ‘modus operandi’, that the defendant was aware or had reasonable grounds to be aware of the probable future impact of its actions.”).
[xi] UCC § 2-312(3) (2002) (“a buyer who furnishes specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless against any such [infringement] claim which arises out of compliance with the specifications”).