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Conceptualizing Negative Limitations in Design Patents

Is it possible for a U.S. design patent claim to include a negative limitation? It does not appear that courts have explicitly addressed this question. That is partly due to emphasis on design patent claims and infringement analyses revolving around the design as a whole, which can lead to rather conclusory decisions. But the question posed here is whether a claimed ornamental design as a whole can contain within it one or more “negative limitations” that effectively indicate the absence of some ornamental aspect, as opposed to indicating the positive (or affirmative) presence of an ornamental aspect. Certain past cases have touched on similar issues without specific reference to “negative limitations” in the sense that term is used with regard to utility patent claims.

Consider a design patent claim that shows as part of the overall ornamental design a flat surface, that is, a solid planar surface that is plain and uninterrupted. Does such a depiction include a negative limitation of sorts that excludes the presence of ornamentation on the surface? That is, does it give rise to a potentially significant overall difference when comparing a perforated surface or a surface that has substantial non-planar texturizing surface ornamentation? The same questions might arise, for instance, when a claimed design depicts only a single element (such as a single rounded corner, single support bar, single hole, etc.) but the accused product includes more than one of those elements.

In general, design patent infringement analysis involves two steps: (1) claim construction and (2) comparison of the properly construed claim to the accused product. Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Theoretically, at least, questions about “negative limitations” in design patents could potentially arise in either of those two steps.

While, certainly, a jury can always reach an ultimate infringing/non-infringing conclusion, in the binary sense, based on the particular and specific facts at hand in any given case. But the topics at hand here are how courts should treat the legal issues surrounding how a finder of fact might be presented with design patent infringement questions where negative limitation issues are present, and also how courts making dismissal (Rule 12(b)(6)), summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), or appeal decisions can explain their reasoning under the ordinary observer test when negative limitations may be present.

Negative Limitations in Design Claim Construction

Design patent infringement analysis begins with claim construction. Although claim construction is also the first step in utility patent infringement analysis, design patent claim construction differs from that for utility patents in some important ways.

A patentable design “gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives form.” Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871); see also Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 429, 432-33 (2016).  This means design patent claim construction must be adapted to the pictorial setting. Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In that sense, the Federal Circuit has said that “[d]epictions of the claimed design in words can easily distract from the proper infringement analysis of the ornamental patterns and drawings.” Id.; see also Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 14 (1886) (a claimed design “is better represented by the photographic illustration than it could be by any description, and a description would probably not be intelligible without the illustration.”). 

The Federal Circuit has cautioned that detailed verbal claim constructions increase “the risk of placing undue emphasis on particular features of the design and the risk that a finder of fact will focus on each individual described feature in the verbal description rather than on the design as a whole.”  Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 680 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).  For such reasons, the level of detail to be used in describing the claimed design is a matter within a court’s discretion, and a court is not obligated to issue a detailed verbal description of the design if it would not be helpful. Id. at 679-80.  Yet a court may use claim construction to help guide the fact finder through issues that bear on claim scope. Id. at 680. 

Although not always at issue in every case, design patent claim construction can address prosecution history estoppel and prosecution history disclaimer.  See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 680.  In general, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel prevents a patentee from “recaptur[ing] in an infringement action the very subject matter surrendered as a condition of receiving the patent.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002).  It requires that “the claims of a patent be interpreted in light of the proceedings in the [US]PTO during the application process.” Id. at 733. The Federal Circuit has specifically held that prosecution history estoppel applies to design patents too.  Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

However, for design patents, unlike with utility patents, “the concepts of literal infringement and equivalents infringement are intertwined.”  Id. at 700-01.  Because it is the drawings of the design patent that provide the description of the invention, courts “look at the requisite drawings in design patents to determine whether a surrender has occurred.” Id. at 702.  Estoppel arises when a narrowing amendment is made to satisfy any requirement to secure the grant of the patent, including amendments to avoid prior art or resulting from a restriction requirement.  Id. at 703-04; see also Advantek Marketing Inc. v. Shanghai Walk-Long Tools Co., 898 F.3d 1210, 1216-17 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

In the Pacific Coast Marine Windshields case, a design application (for U.S. Des. Pat. No. D555,070) originally included drawings depicting—and claiming—multiple embodiments of a boat windshield. As reproduced below, the various originally-claimed embodiments showed the claimed windshield design with different vent hole configurations and also showed claimed designs that included and excluded a hatch on the front of the windshield. The examiner issued a five-way restriction requirement, identifying five distinct groups of designs as windshields with:

  1. four circular holes and a hatch (FIG. 1);
  2. four circular or square holes and no hatch (FIGS. 7 and 12);
  3. no holes and a hatch (FIG. 8);
  4. no holes and no hatch (FIG. 9); and
  5. two oval or rectangular holes and a hatch (FIGS. 10 and 11).
Grid of selected original figures from the application for Des. Pat. No. D555,070

In that sense, the examiner indicated that many of the different embodiments (but not all of them) represented different design inventions. In response, the patentee removed alternate embodiments, thus deleting those alternate embodiments from the scope of the claim. That prosecution history had significant implications to the scope of the claim in the granted design patent before the court (D555,070). Incidentally, the patentee chose to file only one subsequent divisional application to the “no holes and a hatch” embodiment (that became U.S. Des. Pat. No. D569,782), apparently without pursuing any other of the original alternate embodiments—though a continuation application (that became U.S. Des. Pat. No. D593,024) based off the divisional was also later filed for a partial design to only the vertical corner posts with no vent holes (with the windscreen portions unclaimed, thus potentially avoiding hatch vs. no hatch questions).

Noting that treatises and prior district court decisions had said similar things in the past, the Federal Circuit ruled that surrender of claims to the alternate designs was for reasons of patentability that caused prosecution history estoppel to attach. Pac. Coast Marine Windshields, 739 F.3d at 702-04. However, because the accused windshield product’s design had three vent holes (see above) but the patented design had four vent holes (see FIG. 1 above) and the surrendered embodiments/designs had only two vent holes (see original FIGS. 10 and 11 above), summary judgment of non-infringement was reversed and the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 704-05. In other words, without reaching a definitive infringement/non-infringement decision, the patentee was barred from arguing that the design patent’s claim covered a two-hole design (or any other surrendered embodiments) but was still able to argue that a three-hole design might be covered because there was no surrendered three-hole embodiment in the original drawings. (The Federal Circuit decision did not address potential differences in the horizontal/angled frame or trim aspects of the accused design as part of the overall appearance analysis). After remand, and denial of subsequent summary judgment cross motions (which included inventorship disputes, and non-patent issues), the parties eventually settled.

Generally similar negative limitation issues have arisen in utility patent cases. For example, the Spine Solutions case involved questions of claim construction and prosecution history estoppel for a utility patent. Claim 1 of the patent in question recited “a single anchor on each of the upper surface of the upper part and the lower surface of the lower part . . . .” The relevant claim construction implicitly regarded the “single anchor” recitation as including a negative limitation, that is, requiring one anchor having the recited characteristics but excluding the presence of more than one anchor. There was no infringement by the accused device, which had two anchors rather than a “single” anchor as claimed. The Federal Circuit reasoned as follows:

“We agree with [the accused infringer] Medtronic that the court erred in determining that [the accused] O-Maverick [device] literally infringes claims 1 and 2. The [district] court construed ‘single anchor’ to mean, in relevant part, that ‘[t]he upper and lower surfaces of the implant each have one anchor having the characteristics recited in the last paragraph of [claim 1].’ Claim Construction Order, 2008 WL 4831770, at *14, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116648, at *43 (emphasis added). A simple observation of [the accused] O-Maverick [device] confirms that the implant has two anchors on each of the upper and lower pieces, not one. The anchors are separated by a one-millimeter gap that extends all the way to the base of the implant; at no point are the two anchors joined or connected in any way. O-Maverick clearly has two anchors on each piece, not a ‘single anchor’ as recited by claims 1 and 2. Therefore, we hold as a matter of law that [the accused] O-Maverick [device] does not literally infringe claims 1 and 2.

“During prosecution, applicants expressly distinguished the claimed invention over the ‘477 patent by asserting that ‘a reference disclosing two anchors does not disclose a device affirmatively claiming a single anchor… reciting a negative limitation in the form of a single element is not disclosed by prior art which teaches more than one element.’ J.A. 17524. This is a clear disclaimer of claim scope, and prosecution history estoppel therefore bars [the patentee] SSI from arguing that a two-anchor device is equivalent to the claimed implant. Because we hold that [the accused] O-Maverick [device] is a two-anchor device, SSI cannot argue that O-Maverick infringes claims 1 and 2 under the doctrine of equivalents.”

Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

What all these cases emphasize is that negative limitations can be at issue for design patent claim constructions, just as in utility patent cases. Prosecution disclaimer or prosecution estoppel issues resulting from arguments or amendments to a design application are especially relevant here. The Pacific Coast Marine Windshields case illustrates how those issues should be assessed as part of a design claim construction, if and when they arise. Other cases also indicated how this can be significant with respect to words in the design patent claim — such as words in the title that restrict the scope of the claim to a particular article of manufacture. Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re SurgiSil, L.L.P., No. 2020-1940 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2021). It is possible a design patent might include words like “individual” in the title that could include a negative limitation.

What is less certain for design patent claim construction is what role, if any, negative limitations have when the feature in question is something that appears in a drawing but there was no prosecution history disclaimer or estoppel. Because detailed design claim constructions that translate visual depictions into words are disfavored, it would not be appropriate in most situations to single out a particular visual element and explicitly construe it as containing a negative limitation (in the absence of a disclaimer or estoppel). That would depart from the context of the ordinary observer analysis and the requisite visual analysis of the overall appearance of the ornamental design.

Yet there may be instances where a negative limitation appears in relation to functional features, for example. The Federal Circuit has held that a claim construction may help the fact finder “distinguish[] between those features of the claimed design that are ornamental and those that are purely functional.” Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 680 (citing OddzOn Prods., 122 F.3d at 1405).  A design may contain both functional and ornamental elements, even though the scope of a design patent claim “must be limited to the ornamental aspects of the design.” Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Where a design contains both functional and non-functional elements, the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent.” OddzOn Prods., 122 F.3d at 1405; accord Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 796 F.3d at 1333.  This ensures that the claim is limited to the ornamental aspects of the design, and does not extend to “the broader general design concept.” OddzOn Prods., Inc., 122 F.3d at 1405; see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[w]here . . . a design is composed of functional as well as ornamental features, to prove infringement a patent owner must establish that an ordinary person would be deceived by reason of the common features in the claimed and accused designs which are ornamental.”).  But a construction of design features that are only partly functional, with some at least minimal ornamentation, must not entirely eliminate whole aspects from the scope of the claim, even as the functional elements limit and narrow the claim scope.  See Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 820 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 786 F.3d 983, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Negative Limitations in Comparisons Between Claimed Design and Accused Product

Following claim construction, if any, the design patent’s claim as construed is compared to the allegedly infringing products. Elmer, 67 F.3d at 1577.  When considering infringement of a design patent, the “ordinary observer” test is the sole test for determining if infringement has occurred. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (rejecting the use of a separate “point of novelty” test); Crocs, 598 F.3d at 1303.  Under the ordinary observer test, infringement occurs:

“if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”

Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528; Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 670-71.

This test has been codified in the patent laws, which provide as follows:

“Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties.”

35 U.S.C. § 289

Thus, as the ordinary observer test is sometimes described, infringement is not found unless the accused article embodies the patented design or any colorable imitation of it. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 (citations omitted). Though recall that for design patents “the concepts of literal infringement and equivalents infringement are intertwined.”  Pac. Coast Marine Windshields, 739 F.3d at 700-01. 

Against that backdrop, the question of potential negative limitations can arise in the context of whether logos (or the like) present on the accused product can or should be considered when comparing it to the design patent claim to determine if there is infringement.

It is necessary to compare the claimed design (as construed) as a whole to accused product. Ethicon Endo‐Surgery, 796 F.3d at 1335; Crocs, 598 F.3d at 1302-06. This is to say that in the “ordinary observer” analysis, the patented design is viewed in its entirety, as it is claimed.  L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1993). “[A]ll of the ornamental features illustrated in the figures must be considered in evaluating design patent infringement.”  Contessa Food Prods., 282 F.3d at 1378.  “A patented design is defined by the drawings in the patent, not just by one feature of the claimed design.” KeyStone Retaining Wall Sys., 997 F.2d at 1450. This means the comparison of the claimed design (as construed) to the accused product must generally include all of the patent figures in comparison, and it cannot merely compare separate elements in isolation or involve serial element-by-element comparison.

Yet an infringement analysis that recites significant differences between the ornamental features of the claimed and accused designs is still acceptable if, in determining infringement, that analysis still mainly focuses on whether an ordinary observer would be deceived into thinking that the accused product’s design was the same as the patented design. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2010). It is in that sense that negative limitations can be used to help articulate significant differences from the standpoint of an ordinary observer.

Along those lines, the Federal Circuit has held that the finder of fact can consider “an ornamental logo, its placement, and its appearance as one among other potential differences between a patented design and an accused one.” Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., 942 F.3d 1119, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In a subsequent August 2021 trial under that guidance, a jury found no infringement. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc. v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01781 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) (jury verdict of non-infringement). The parties subsequently cross appealed.

In Columbia, the patent owner sometimes made a comparison of only a selected portion of the claimed design to the accused product in briefing. This had the effect of broadening the asserted claim. For instance, in the first comparative example below for district court summary judgment briefing, note how the claimed design uses broken lines in FIG. 1 to show that a boundary exists but is unclaimed (see MPEP § 1503.02(III) (9th Ed., Rev. 10.2019, June 2020)). But the claimed design of FIG. 1 includes a generally sinusoidal wave pattern with four full crests and five full troughs that appear uninterrupted between the broken line boundaries; whereas in a comparison table used in briefing only part of the claim with merely three full (and uninterrupted) crests and troughs was reproduced as allegedly being the “Patented Design”. And in the second example below, from appellate briefing, note how FIG. 2 is used by the patentee for comparison despite the asserted design patent stating that “FIG. 2 is an enlarged elevational view thereof, taken from any area in the design” (that is, FIG. 2 merely shows an enlargement of a portion [with]in the claimed design but does not show the entire claimed design). If we analogize this to the utility patent context, it is like comparing a selected claim limitation to the accused product in isolation without addressing one or more additional limitations present in the claim. The significance of the accused product’s interruption (with repeating logos) in comparison to the claimed uninterrupted design was a key issue in the case including its appeals. So the question of what constitutes the full scope of the claimed design is foundational to what is or is not interrupted in the accused product.

The district court declined to construe the design patent claim with a detailed verbal description in its Markman order, or to provide any other construction or guidance about design patent conventions, but instead later provided jury instructions that stated:

“A design patent’s claim defines what is covered by the patent. The claim is typically represented by illustrations. It is permissible to illustrate more than one embodiment of a design in a single design patent application. Each design patent contains multiple drawings to illustrate the claimed design.

The scope of the claim encompasses the design’s visual appearance as a whole. It does not cover a general design concept and is not limited to isolated features of the drawings. An inventor’s subjective intent is not relevant to the scope of the claimed design”

Quote from Jury Instruction No. 9 (as filed Aug. 6, 2021)

That jury instruction (No. 9) was largely generic. It could have been issued in any design patent case without changing a word. Neither the jury instruction nor the Markman order specifically addressed the proper interpretation of the language describing FIG. 2 quoted above, which is part of the claim. Most significantly, the jury was not instructed to disregard the presence of logos on the accused product (as Columbia had sought). But, additionally, the jury was not instructed about whether the asserted design patent actually included multiple embodiments or whether certain drawings showed the same design or merely incomplete portions of it. That meant that, in the Columbia case, there was no express “negative limitation” claim construction. Instead, everything came down to the comparison of the overall appearances.

“To determine infringement of a design patent, you must compare the overall appearances of the accused design to the Design Patent. The accused design is Seirus’s HeatWave fabric. If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the overall appearance of the accused design is substantially the same as the overall appearance of the Design Patent, you must find that the accused design infringed the Design Patent.

Two designs are substantially the same if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, the resemblance between the two designs is such as to deceive an ordinary observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other. You do not need, however, to find that any purchasers were actually deceived or confused by the appearance of the accused products. You should consider any perceived similarities or differences between the patented and accused designs. Minor differences should not prevent a finding of infringement.”

Quote from Jury Instruction No. 10 (as filed Aug. 6, 2021)

The jury instruction (No. 10) regarding the comparison step did mention the accused product by name. But otherwise that instruction is also fairly generic. Jury instructions nos. 11-13 also pertained to design-patent-specific issues, including comments about the proper use of prior art in instruction no. 11.

The district court could have provided further claim construction guidance. But it chose not to. As already noted, the jury held that the patented design was not infringed. On the next appeal, there will surely be a dispute over the ultimate verdict of non-infringement of the design patent, but also perhaps about the mostly generic jury instructions related to design patent claim construction and infringement analysis and how those impact any “negative limitations” in the design patent claim. Though, interestingly, at the district court neither party really argued this point regarding the proposed final jury instructions for the August 2021 trial (most of the arguments over those instructions instead centered around what could be ignored, proper consideration of marketing materials evidence, how functionality should be referenced if at all, and the relevance and proper role of alleged prior art).

Conclusion

The appropriate way to address “negative limitations” in design patent claims is: first, to address in claim construction any prosecution history disclaimer or prosecution history estoppel issues that might give rise to recapture issues around such “negative limitations”, as well as any relevant interpretations of the text of the claim (including the title and description) that might do the same; and, second, to articulate the way design features affirmatively present in the accused design represent significant differences from such “negative limitations” in the claimed design in an analysis that still mainly focuses on whether an ordinary observer would be deceived into thinking that the accused product’s design was the same as the patented design overall.

The first aspect might not be relevant in all cases. Those questions will be highly dependent on the content of the asserted design patent claim and the prosecution history. But the second aspect could potentially apply whenever the asserted design patent appears to recite, in part, a “negative limitation”. This second part might impact jury instructions, as well as the way a case is argued to the finder of fact. It could also impact a pre-suit opinion of counsel analysis. Both factors might come up as part of dismissal, summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and/or JMOL motions, as well as in appeals.

January 2022
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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

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Copyrights Q&A

How Can I Use a Copyright Notice?

Introduction

Copyright notices have some legal value but are often not required in order to have copyright ownership. To understand generally what is meant by a copyright notice, consider the following example:

Example copyright notice: "© 2000 Jane Doe"
Example notice

Copyright notice is optional for works published on or after March 1, 1989 (but was generally required for U.S. works published before then), unpublished works, and foreign works. But despite being optional for new and recent works, including a notice still provides various benefits. Bear in mind that while you probably see copyright notices in many places, ones that you come across (especially online) may not be in the correct form to constitute a formal notice under U.S. law.

We will first look at the benefits of using a copyright notice before turning to the specific elements required for a proper notice under U.S. law and the proper placement of a notice on copies of a given work. Formulating a proper notice for your own work will require gathering some relevant information and making some judgments. As will be seen, there are actually quite a number of factors that need to be considered in order to correctly provide all the required elements of a notice in order to gain all possible legal benefits. But even an erroneous copyright notice might have some value, if only as a potential deterrent against authorized use.

Benefits of Using a Copyright Notice

Although use is optional, providing a copyright notice has a number of practical and legal benefits for the copyright owner, including:

  • Notice makes potential web site visitors aware that copyright is claimed in a given work, that is, it provides a “copy at your own risk” warning that may help discourage infringement;
  • A notice may prevent an accused infringer from attempting to limit his, her, or its liability for certain damages in court based on an innocent infringement defense (17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d) and 402(d));
  • Inclusion of a notice or other copyright management information (CMI) might provide an additional basis for monetary recovery if an infringer removes the notice (or other CMI) having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement (17 U.S.C. §§ 1202 and 1203);
  • It identifies the copyright owner for parties seeking permission to use the work (that is, it can help potential licensees find the owner and may prevent the work from becoming a so-called “orphan work”).

Another benefit, of sorts, is that copyright notices can freely be added to a work. A copyright registration is not required in order to utilize a copyright notice. And many times the process is simple enough that nearly anyone can add a copyright notice to a work without assistance. Although some effort is required to gather and confirm the information included in the notice, the cost to actually attached the notice to many types of works may be close to nothing, particularly for text-based works or those in digital formats.

In theory, copyright notices also provide a public benefit by identifying the year of first publication. That information might help determine when copyright in the work expires. But ever since the laws were changed such that omission of a notice (or use of certain erroneous notices) does not result in the loss of copyright, notices ceased to be reliable as an indicator of publication. And on top of that, now that the copyright term for many works is based on the life of the (last surviving) author, rather than publication, the formal elements of a copyright notice, alone, do not allow the term of copyright to be determined—though if an author’s name is listed the notice might help you start to investigate that author’s lifespan.

The Elements of a Proper Copyright Notice

Overview of Basic Requirements

A copyright notice is a statement placed on copies of a work to inform the public that a copyright owner is claiming ownership. A copyright registration is not required in order to utilize a copyright notice. A proper notice (under 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(b) and 402(b)) for a published work consists of three elements that generally appear as a single continuous statement in the following order:

  1. The copyright symbol © (the letter C in a circle), the word “copyright”, or the abbreviation “copr.” (or, for phonorecords, the symbol ℗ );
  2. The year of first publication of the work, though in the case of compilations, or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient; and
  3. The name of the copyright owner, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner.

This example shows these three elements in a formal copyright notice:

Example Copyright Notice

We will look at each of these three basic elements of the notice in more detail below. Though the notice generally needs to be in the English language (with foreign words, such as the owner’s name, translated or transliterated into English).

Although certain old U.S. copyright laws required a copyright notice on published “United States works” in order to preserve copyright ownership, for any work created on or after March 1, 1989 a copyright notice is completely optional. And foreign works never required a notice under U.S. law.

It is possible to distinguish between general and specific copyright notices. A general notice might be applied to an entire book, or appear in the footer of all pages of a web site. Specific notices are directed at some specific part of something, such as an individual photo in a book or on a web page. Specific rather than general notices are usually not required, because the law makes any copyright notice optional. That holds even if a work includes material that is not copyrighted or owned by someone other than the owner identified in a general notice. However, where something includes both phonorecord and non-phonorecord works, multiple notices or at least multiple symbols in a single notice would be needed to fully obtain the legal benefits of notice because of the different requirements for the use of © and ℗ symbols in notices for those different types of works. And specific notices may be required based on the terms and conditions associated with use of particular content (such as license or other contractual terms). Also, U.S. copyright law includes certain prohibitions on removal of copyright management information (CMI), which may necessitate a specific notice in order to be compliant. For instance, frequently used “Creative Commons” copyright licenses (for instance, “CC BY 4.0”) include attribution requirements and prohibit removal of an existing copyright notice. So specific notices are more common when using content owned by someone else. But the explanation that follows applies to both general and specific notices.

Flowchart

The following flowchart explains major determinations that should be made in order to establish the proper information specified in a copyright notice and to affix the notice on copies. It is important to note that the U.S. copyright laws include many special statutory definitions of words, which frequently differ from their meaning in ordinary conversation. Therefore it is critical to check the legal definitions of the words used in this flowchart. Also, there may be situations in which multiple types of works are involved meaning that the flow chart may need to be applied multiple times in order to fully assess proper notice requirements across all of the involved works.

Specific steps shown in this flowchart are explained in greater detail below.

First Element — Copyright Symbol © (or Acceptable Alternative) or Phonorecord Symbol ℗

The first element needed for a proper copyright notice is either the copyright symbol (or something recognized as an acceptable alternative) or the phonorecord symbol. (17 U.S.C. §§ 401(b)(1) and 402(b)(1)). So the first determination is whether the work in question is a “phonorecord” (as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101: “material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed . . . .”) or something else. Unless the work is an audio recording, it is probably not a phonorecord.

Though keep in mind that there are situations where use of multiple notices encompassing both symbols (© and ℗) are appropriate because both phonorecord and non-phonorecord works are present—like a music album containing a sound recording as well as liner notes. Alternatively, in certain situations involving audio recordings and non-audio works it is fairly common to see a single notice that uses both the © and ℗ symbols immediately adjacent to each other, which is something not explicitly provided for in the statutes but seems acceptable if the year of first publication and owner name are both identical for the phonorecord and non-phonorecord works.

The copyright symbol “©” is the letter C in a circle. The U.S. copyright statutes say that the word “copyright”, or the abbreviation “copr.” are acceptable alternatives to the copyright symbol. Using the letter C in parentheses, “(C)”, is technically not what the U.S. copyright statutes indicate. However, the U.S. Copyright Office has long considered “(C)” to be one of a few acceptable variants. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 2204.4(A).

The phonorecord symbol “℗” is the letter P in a circle. The U.S. copyright statutes do not enumerate any acceptable alternatives. However, the U.S. Copyright Office has long considered “(P)” to be one of a few acceptable variants. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 2204.4(A).

The copyright and phonorecord symbols (© and ℗) can either be copied-and-pasted into a notice or there are keystrokes that can be used to insert it while typing (these keystrokes vary depending on the computer system being used). Many word processing systems will auto-correct a letter C in parentheses sequence to the copyright symbol.

The term “All Rights Reserved” or the like is not an element of the notice prescribed by U.S. law, and it is not an acceptable variant or substitute for the copyright or phonorecord symbols (© or ℗). Instead, such a statement would be considered additional copyright management information.

Second Element — Year of First Publication

The second element of a proper copyright notice is the year of first publication of the work. (17 U.S.C. §§ 401(b)(2) and 402(b)(2)). What does or does not constitute “publication” under the statutory definition in the U.S. copyright laws is not straightforward, especially for digital and online works where the distinction between mere public display and actual publication is not always clear—and courts are divided on that question for works posted to the Internet by the copyright owner. (See Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, Chapter 1900 and § 1008.3 et seq.; and, e.g., Internet Prods. LLC v. LLJ Ents., Inc., No. 18-cv-15421 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2020)). But that is the most important consideration for the second element of the notice.

‘Publication’ is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.

To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means—

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”

17 U.S.C. § 101 Statutory Definitions of “Publication” and “To perform or display a work ‘publicly'” (emphasis added)

The U.S. copyright statutes say that in the case of “compilations” or “derivative works” incorporating previously published material, specifying the year (date) of first publication of the compilation or derivative work in the notice is sufficient. In other words, for a derivative work, such as a newer version of previously-published content, the more recent publication year for the newer version can be used. The same goes for a compilation. A “collective work” (in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole) or is a collection and assembling of preexisting materials that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship, is a compilation and the same option to omit the year applies. The statues also say that a single notice is sufficient for a collective work.

If a work is unpublished, there is no year of first publication. The statutory requirements for the form and content of a copyright notice for a published work don’t apply to unpublished works. So copyright owners can technically use any form of notice they wish with an unpublished work. Some say that a copyright notice for an unpublished work should indicate the unpublished nature of the work in lieu of a year. Others say that the term “unpublished work” should be included in the notice in addition to specifying the year of creation. Though out in the real world, it is common to see copyright notices on unpublished works that include the year of creation rather than the year of publication without any express indication of unpublished status (even though this could be mistaken for the year of publication) or that only use the copyright symbol with the owner name. Because U.S. copyright statutes do not address the form of notices for unpublished works, there are no clear consequences to the copyright owner no matter how such copyright notices are formatted.

It is sometimes common to see a range of years used. For published works, the use of a date range is not something expressly addressed in the statute. Though as noted above, if the work is a collective work or a compilation (both of those terms are defined in the copyright statutes), then only the year of first publication of the compilation or collective work (and not those of the preexisting works) needs to be specified. And for unpublished works, there is no year of publication and no specific statutory framework for a proper notice.

The statute regarding copyright notices on (non-phonorecord) copies also includes an odd carve-out. The year (date) of first publication in a copyright notice may be omitted “where a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful articles.” The term “useful article” has a statutory definition. So, depending on what sort of things the notice is applied to, it may be permitted to omit the year of publication. Though nothing prohibits including the publication year in such a notice anyway.

As a final note, the year is most often provided in Arabic numerals. Sometimes Roman numerals are used instead, most often with films and television programs (a practice that is thought to have originated as deception to obscure the age of the work).

Third Element — Name(s) of Copyright Owner(s)

The name of the copyright owner (or joint owners) is the third required element for a proper copyright notice. (17 U.S.C. §§ 401(b)(3) and 402(b)(3)). This is an area where mistakes are common in corporate settings, usually because of bad assumptions about who is actually the copyright owner.

Firstly, the owner or joint owners each need to be either an individual or a juristic entity (like a corporation). A brand name (trademark) is not a juristic entity, any more than a fictional character in a book or movie is one. The owner has to be a person or entity capable of legally owning property. Though a proper copyright notice can include variants, abbreviations, generally known alternative designations, or pseudonyms of the owner’s name, such as such as a legal assumed name or “dba” (doing business as) for a business or the diminutive/short form “Joe Public” instead of the full legal name “Joseph Public”. There also is a statutory provision for naming a producer that applies only for phonorecords.

But who is the true owner of a given copyright? This is the part that causes headaches. It might not be clear at all! It might (and often does in commercial settings) require a detailed review of legal provisions in relevant contracts and consideration of the factual context around the creation of the work(s) in question. If the person adding the copyright notice to a work does not know that information or have access to it, then someone else needs to be involved to establish the proper owner name for the notice.

Copyright ownership originally arises in the author(s) under U.S. law, and ownership of copyright is distinct from ownership of material object (a copy, even the sole “original” like a fine art painting). A work created by an individual author in an independent capacity is owned by that individual. Such situations are relatively straightforward. But the inquiry is more complicated in business contexts where corporations, employee/employer relationships, and vendor/contractor outsourcing may be present. A given work may be a “work made for hire” under U.S. law that shifts authorship and ownership of a work away from the individual(s) who prepared it. But work made for hire determinations can be difficult and highly confusing.

If an employee created the work within the scope of his or her employment, then it is a “work made for hire” and the employer is automatically deemed the author and copyright owner. That kind of work made for hire has two components that must both be satisfied: the work must have been prepared (1) by an employee (a status determined under general federal agency law) (2) within the scope of his or her employment. For example, the owner of a startup small business may not be an “employee” if her role is only that of an investor/shareholder without any job duties or receipt of salary/wages. And even someone who is an employee may not have created the specific work(s) in question within the scope of his or her employment. For instance, a work created by a person in her spare time with no relationship to her job duties would not be within the scope of her employment.

If a vendor (or contractor) created the work, then the vendor would usually be the author and own the copyright in the absence of a written assignment—unless authorship and ownership instead reside in the vendor’s employee(s) or subcontractor(s). The mere fact that the vendor/contractor was paid to create the work does not transfer ownership of copyright. Work-made-for-hire provisions dealing with employee-prepared works do not apply because contractors and vendors are not employees. Though work-made-for-hire provisions might make a corporate vendor the owner of works the vendor’s employees prepare. It is possible to agree in writing in advance to make certain types of works a “work made for hire” for which the purchaser is deemed the author (and owner), but only for nine types of works enumerated by statute (17 U.S.C. § 101). If the work is not one of the nine statutory types, a contract with a vendor/contractor (erroneously) purporting to create a work made for hire has no legal effect and ownership still rests with the vendor/contractor (or its employee or subcontractor) until a written assignment is executed.

If there are agreements in place with a vendor/contractor, they may or may not actually transfer ownership of copyright. Sometimes vendor/contractor agreements establish only an obligation to assign (such as when they use language referring to future actions, like “will own” or “will assign”), and therefore require a further written assignment to actually transfer copyright ownership. Or sometimes these agreements include an ineffective work made for hire provision that fails to actually transfer ownership of copyright (because the work is not one of the nine statutory types). Tracking down copyright ownership information can be time-consuming. For instance, master services agreements might incorporate separate “statement of work” documents that identify assigned works and those might all need to be reviewed in order to determine who owns what.

Possible Additional Element — Restrictions/Exclusions, Terms of Use, Etc.

Although the U.S. copyright statutes specify three elements required for a copyright notice, there might be other information included in addition. Only one of these additional elements is required under the U.S. copyright statutes to have a proper notice, and that situation is not common. Though additional elements included along with (or adjacent to) a copyright notice might be desired. The law does acknowledge the potential use of various additional copyright management information (CMI).

For instance, there might be an exclusion stated. A copyright notice with an exclusion is referred to as a restricted notice. A semi-common one, which stems from a statutory requirement for works consisting predominantly of re-used work(s) of the (federal) U.S. Government (for which there is no copyright), is “No claim to original U.S. Government works.” But there could be others, such as “© 2000 Jane Doe, no copyright claimed in illustrations” or “© 2000 Jane Doe, no copyright claimed in public domain photo.” Generally there is no need to include a restriction or exclusion unless the work is predominantly or significantly made up of materials not owned by the entity in the copyright notice.

Different kinds of additional CMI can be provided along with the copyright notice too. For instance explicit statements granting certain authorizations or licenses but prohibiting other things—that is, terms and conditions for use of the work—might be specified adjacent to the copyright notice, if desired.

Placement of a Copyright Notice

A copyright notice needs to be placed on copies of a work in a way that people are reasonably likely to see it. The U.S. statute about copyright notices for most types of works says:

The notice shall be affixed to the copies in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. The Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, as examples, specific methods of affixation and positions of the notice on various types of works that will satisfy this requirement, but these specifications shall not be considered exhaustive.”

17 U.S.C. § 401(c)

The regulations referred to in the statute are found at 37 C.F.R. § 202.2. They include a large number of examples that pertain to particular types of works in specific ways. There are examples for works in book form, works reproduced in machine-readable copies, contributions to collective works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. But, in general, the acceptability of a “reasonable” notice depends upon its being permanently legible to an ordinary user of the work under normal conditions of use, and on being affixed to copies in such a manner and position that the notice is not concealed from view upon reasonable examination. Where a notice does not appear in one of the precise locations described in the regulation’s specific examples, but a person looking in one of those locations would be reasonably certain to find a notice in another somewhat different location, the Register of Copyrights considers it acceptable.

The regulations give examples of defective notices as:

  • those permanently covered so that they cannot be seen without tearing the work apart,
  • those illegible or so small that they cannot be read without the aid of a magnifying glass (except where the work itself requires magnification for its ordinary use), and
  • those placed on a detachable tag, wrapper, or container that is not part of the work and will eventually be detached/removed and discarded when the work is put in use.

The statutory benefits that arise from use of a copyright notice are not affected by the removal, destruction, or obliteration of the notice from any publicly distributed copies (or phonorecords) done without the authorization of the copyright owner. (17 U.S.C. § 405(c)).

For phonorecord copyright notices, the relevant statute provides that “The notice shall be placed on the surface of the phonorecord, or on the phonorecord label or container, in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright.” (17 U.S.C. § 402(c)).

Failure to include a proper copyright notice, or the use of a notice with erroneous information, is more significant for works published before March 1, 1989. There are various additional provisions governing those situations.

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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

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Copyrights Q&A

What Are Common Copyright Issues When Using a CMS Like WordPress?

It is very common for individuals and businesses to use a content management system (CMS), like WordPress®, Drupal®, or ConcreteCMSTM, to create and maintain a web site. The original text, photos, graphics, and other content that is paced on such a web site with the CMS is usually copyrighted. But copyright law is challenging. Web developers often do not understand it well. And the terminology used in a CMS system may or may not align with the (disputed) legal meaning given to those same words for copyright purposes. That can cause confusion because web developers and web site administrators often misunderstand the impact of their web site design choices under copyright law. And that law is also not always clear or well-settled—courts sometimes disagree over key points or just have not yet offered definitive interpretations when it comes to online works.

What follows is an overview of two of the most common areas of confusion, using the WordPress CMS as an example. Sure, there many, many other confusing aspects of copyright law that apply to web site development, like whether something constitutes a “work made for hire” when a vendor is involved. But those are topics for another time. The two common areas of confusion addressed here are the meaning of “publication” and the proper form of a copyright notice for works made available online.

What Does It Mean to “Publish” Something Online?

The word “published” does not necessarily mean the same thing under U.S. copyright law that it does in ordinary language. It has a special legal definition for copyright purposes, as discussed below. The question really becomes whether “publish” and “publication” have the same meaning under copyright law as when commonly used to describe features and functionality within the CMS. We will see here that those meanings might be different—and the way the statutory definition applies to online works is disputed. This can make it surprisingly difficult to establish publication dates in order to register a copyright in works created or maintained using a CMS, for instance.

Let’s look at how this confusion about the meaning of “publication” can arise, starting with typical CMS functionality.

“Publish” and “Update” Buttons in WordPress

In a CMS like WordPress, it is easy to create web pages and posts with text and media like photos, video, audio, etc. Those individual posts and pages can have different statuses, allowing them be saved as drafts or made public. The visibility of a given post or page can be specified to be public (rather than private or password protected) and can be made public by clicking a “publish” button along with a “public” visibility setting. Content that the CMS “publishes” goes live on web server, so that web site visitors can view the live content that has been “published”. Though, depending on CMS user privileges (roles), the “publish” button might only be visible to administrators/editors. In any event, CMS functionality generally uses the word “publish” to mean making a page or post live, allowing web site visitors to view it (assuming the visibility of the post or page is not private).

The WordPress CMS allows control over scheduling when a post or page goes live. It is possible to schedule a post to publish as some particular date and time in the future. But it is also possible to backdate the date that appears on the post. That is, the publication date can be set as some time in the past. Clearly this does not mean that the post was really available in the past. But it does mean that the date that appears on a live, visitor-facing page or post is not always accurate with respect to when it was actually first made live and publicly accessible. And, naturally, the date appearing on a page or post will not reflect any prior (or subsequent) offline distribution of the same materials.

Online works are frequently treated as living documents that are revised and modified over time. After the “publish” button has made a given page or post go live online, it can be revised and modified in all sorts of ways. There might be significant changes or additions. WordPress has an “Update” button that works much like the “publish” button to make changes go live online. But when the live version of a post is updated, the date shown on the live post typically does not change (unless a CMS user changes it). The visitor-facing post may not indicate the date changes were made (or what the changes were). Also, an authorship byline may be established when originally made live. If there are later changes, the live, visitor-facing version may not indicate that later changes were made by a different person (or author).

Previously live posts/pages can also be made private or changed to draft status. The CMS can take down content from the live web site. But that might happen only temporarily. The content can be made live again later.

WordPress CMS administrators and editors can see the version history for a given post or page that tracks “revisions”—some users may be limited to seeing only their own revisions. However, which revision(s) were merely saved with a “draft” status and which revision(s) where made live online by being published or updated is not particularly easy to determine through the standard WordPress user interface. That is especially true, for example, if a post or page was published, then later unpublished, modified, then published again in modified form.

Revision history can allow the CMS username associated with particular changes to be determined after the fact. But if there are shared logins, it might be unclear which individual person or persons (authors) actually made particular changes or additions. Also, different CMS implementations might save only a limited number of historical revisions. So old revision history may no longer be available.

If the CMS doesn’t have all the revision history desired, it may be possible to find earlier version in a public archive like the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, assuming the site was crawled by the archive at a relevant time.

It is also possible to go beyond default CMS functionality to create your own archive of revisions. In other words, you can keep your own records outside of the default functionality of the CMS. Though if you want your own archive to have legal evidentiary value you likely want to take steps to ensure that custody of the archive is reliably established and maintained in order to later authenticate it. But that may be more than what is necessary or worthwhile in many situations. There is no requirement to do that for copyright purposes, though if available such records might make information useful for copyright registration easier to find.

“Publication” Under U.S. Copyright Law

U.S. copyright statutes include an explicit definition of “publication”, and a related definition of “to perform or display a work ‘publicly'”:

” ‘Publication’ is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication.

To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means—

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”

17 U.S.C. § 101 Definitions of “Publication” and “To perform or display a work ‘publicly'”

Notice that the copyright law definition of “publication” excludes some things. So the definition is not just a positive definition of what affirmatively is publication. It also is partly a negative definition that explains what is not publication.

The other thing to notice is that this definition is a general one that does not include any Internet-related terminology. There is no reference to web sites, web pages, online streaming, or anything of the sort. That is because the definition came about before the Internet—and even before personal computers and photocopiers were widespread! So a certain amount of judgment is required to determine how online activities using a CMS fit into the definition. A lot of the confusion here stems from the laws and legal definitions being written when “publication” was a complicated process that involved extensive planning and effort. Just think about what goes into publishing a printed and bound book, and how getting it to a different country required physically shipping copies. The idea that something might be published worldwide by just about anyone with no more than a click of a button on an Internet-connected computer was not a possibility at the time the statutory definition was enacted.

The U.S. Copyright Office provides its own further interpretations of the statutory definition of “publication”. Those interpretations draw from legislative history of the U.S. copyright statutes. While it is possible that courts might someday definitively reject some of the Copyright Office’s interpretations, as certain courts already have, they are a good (and perhaps necessary) starting point. Anyway, the Copyright Office’s interpretations start by noting what is implied but not explicitly stated in the statutory definition:

“legislative history explains that ‘a work is ‘published’ if one or more copies or phonorecords embodying [the work] are distributed to the public’ with ‘no explicit or implicit restrictions with respect to [the] disclosure of [the] contents [of that work].’ H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 138 (1976). It also explains that publication occurs ‘when copies or phonorecords are offered to a group of wholesalers, broadcasters, motion picture theatres, etc.’ for the purpose of ‘further distribution, public performance, or public display.’ Id.

Although it is not expressly stated in the statutory definition, the legislative history indicates that publication occurs only (i) when copies or phonorecords are distributed by or with the authority of the copyright owner, or (ii) when an offer to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for further distribution, public performance, or public display is made by or with the authority of the copyright owner.”

Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 1902 (emphasis added) (internal citation truncated)

So far, this seems fine. It is helpful, and uncontroversial, to say that the statutory reference to “copies” includes a single copy and that all this is only about things authorized by the copyright owner. But there is more to the story. The U.S. Copyright Office provides some further guidance regarding the interpretation of publication for works made available online that is less intuitive . It is this next part that is the source of confusion in the web site CMS context.

“As a general rule, the U.S. Copyright Office considers a work ‘published’ when it is made available online if the copyright owner authorizes the end user to retain copies or phonorecords of that work. For example, the fact that a work is expressly authorized for reproduction or download by members of the public or is expressly authorized for distribution by the public creates a reasonable inference that copies or phonorecords have been distributed and that publication has occurred.

Likewise, the Office generally considers a work ‘published’ when the copyright owner makes copies or phonorecords available online and offers to distribute them to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display. ***

It may seem odd that allowing the whole world to view or hear a work does not constitute publication of a work, but the statutory definition is clear that the public performance or public display of a work does not, in and of itself, constitute publication.”

Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 1008.3(B) (emphasis added)

Confused? Perhaps. Convinced? Maybe, or maybe not. Anyway, this framework raises further questions about the “reasonable” inferences that the Copyright Office says determine whether or not clicking “publish” or “update” on a CMS like WordPress constitutes publication of web site materials under U.S. copyright law. These questions tend to depend on circumstances beyond the mere act of clicking a publish or update button to make materials go live. The Copyright Office says this depends on the substantive content of the web page in question—and potentially also on offline actions regarding distribution of physical copies, if applicable.

When considering potential publication of copyrightable works, it is necessary to remember the statutory distinction between (1) a mere public display versus (2) actual publication. For works available online, the U.S. Copyright Office mostly looks at this in terms of whether there is an express or implied authorization of publication from the copyright owner that goes beyond public display. The Copyright Office does not make that determination for you. But it provides the following guidance about the sorts of factors that it says should be considered that are not explicitly found in the statutory definition.

“A critical element of publication is that the distribution of copies or phonorecords to the public must be authorized by the copyright owner. To be considered published, the copyright owner must expressly or impliedly authorize users to make retainable copies or phonorecords of the work, whether by downloading, printing, or by other means.

A distribution or offer to distribute that has not been authorized by the copyright owner does not constitute publication. Thus, the mere fact that a work is disclosed on the internet does not ‘publish’ the work. The end user’s technical capacity to copy, capture, save, or otherwise reproduce a work in and of itself does not imply that the copyright owner authorized the distribution or publication of that work, unless there is an express or implied-in-fact authorization that supports such an inference. Likewise, the fact that it may be possible for an end user to reproduce or distribute a work that has been authorized only for public display or public performance online does not mean that publication has occurred.

***

While it is often a simple matter to determine whether a distribution of tangible copies was authorized by the copyright owner, it is not always factually clear whether the placement of works online is intended to be an authorized distribution of those works or merely an authorized public performance or public display.

Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 1008.3(C) (emphasis added)

A variety of factors may be relevant in determining whether a copyright owner published website content by impliedly authorizing users to make copies of that content. Examples of factors that may be considered include the following:

Whether there are indications on the website or webpage relevant to the work indicating that the copyright owner intends for the work to be distributed to the user via download, saving, printing, or emailing, such as the presence of a ‘download,’ ‘save,’ or ’email’ button for a particular work.

• Whether the copyright owner expressly reserved copyright rights in the work or explicitly prohibited the reproduction or distribution of the work in whole or in part.

• Whether the copyright owner employed barriers to the reproduction or distribution of the work, such as technological measures that disable or impair a web browser’s print, copy, and/or save capabilities.

Whether the copyright owner permitted the work to be streamed or displayed, but did not expressly permit the work to be copied or downloaded.

Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 1008.3(C) (emphasis added)

Furthermore, the U.S. Copyright Office considers intermediate or buffer copies made in the course of ordinary online streaming or web site browsing to be “irrelevant” or at least “doubtful” as to an implied authorization to create and permanently retain copies. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 1008.3(E).

All this Copyright Office guidance is not necessarily built on indisputable logic—indeed, some courts have rejected it (though others have adopted it, even if Chevron deference is the only justification given). And the Copyright Office couches much of this guidance in terms of what it believes typical copyright owners would believe, which may not be what all copyright owners actually believe. After all, web pages can be printed using a print function in a browser or a screenshot function of an operating system even if there is no “print” or “save” button on the web page, and site owners might understand the impact of that differently than the Copyright Office claims they do.

The crux of the confusion (and related dispute) comes down to the U.S. Copyright Office’s position that it is necessary to interpret typical web site activities to allow for either public display without publication or true publication.

But one district court decision specifically held to the contrary that

“merely by accessing a webpage, an Internet user acquires the ability to make a copy of that webpage, a copy that is, in fact, indistinguishable in every part from the original. Consequently, when a website goes live, the creator loses the ability to control either duplication or further distribution of his or her work. A webpage in this respect is indistinguishable from photographs, music files or software posted on the web — all can be freely copied. Thus, when a webpage goes live on the Internet, it is distributed and ‘published’ . . . .”

Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added)

That is, this particular district court ruled that the law is the opposite of what the U.S. Copyright Office’s Compendium guidance says regarding the “publication” status of web pages that are made live on the Internet by the copyright owner. If this ruling was conclusively found to be the law in all U.S. courts, and not merely in some, then confusion over the impact of clicking the “publish” button in a CMS like WordPress would disappear—clicking “publish” in the CMS would always result in “publication” for copyright registration purposes. For this alternate view to prevail, the U.S. Copyright Office would have to change its position and/or have its position definitively overturned by the courts. At the moment, courts are split on this issue.

Summary — “Publication” of Online Materials

So, to summarize, clicking “publish” or “update” in a web site CMS like WordPress to make a page or post go live online may or may not constitute “publication” of those materials for purposes of U.S. copyright law. This is still a legally unsettled question. The U.S. Copyright Office says clicking “publish” or “update” will at least result in a public display of the work(s) on that page or post, but that additional substantive facts determine if that results in “publication” or not depending on whether site visitors are expressly or impliedly allowed to retain a copy of the work (and says that a relatively ordinary web page or post probably would not do that). Keep in mind here that headers, footers, and other materials that are automatically appended to all pages or post by the CMS might influence this determination in the eyes of the Copyright Office, as will reasonably prominent notices or disclaimers (even if their full terms require clicking through to another page). Though a few courts have rejected this Copyright Office position about online publication.

If you want an online work to be considered published in the eyes of the U.S. Copyright Office, the simplest ways to do that are to add some explicit authorization to that effect (in text) or some kind of “print,” “download,” “save,” or similar button.

If you want an online work to be considered unpublished (but you still want them to appear online), the simplest ways to do that in terms of the U.S. Copyright Office’s position are to explicitly identify the work as unpublished or to place explicit restrictions on those materials that limit the terms of use to only public display. Though some courts have rejected this approach and have said posting anything to a live, publicly-accessible web page always constitutes publication for copyright purposes.

When creating web sites and making them available online, the question of whether or not “publication” has occurred may not immediately make any difference. But the question may become significant if a copyright registration is sought. And registration is often important if infringement occurs—registration (or refusal) being a prerequisite to suing for infringement. Lastly, “publication” may determine when the term of copyright expires for certain works.

What has been said above is fairly specific to U.S. law. Foreign countries may have different copyright laws that treat this question differently (or this question might not matter at all in some countries).

Including a Proper Copyright Notice

Copyright notices have some legal value but are not required in order to have copyright ownership for recent U.S. works (relevant U.S. copyright law changed in 1989). They are optional. But including them still provides some benefits. A copyright registration is not required to use a notice. To understand generally what is meant by a copyright notice, consider the following example:

Example copyright notice: "© 2000 Jane Doe"

Although use of a copyright notice is optional, providing a copyright notice has a number of benefits, including:

  • Notice makes potential web site visitors aware that copyright is claimed in a given work, that is, it provides a “copy at your own risk” warning that may help discourage infringement;
  • A notice may prevent an accused infringer from attempting to limit his, her, or its liability for certain damages in court based on an innocent infringement defense (17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d) and 402(d));
  • Inclusion of a notice or other copyright management information (CMI) might provide an additional basis for monetary recovery if an infringer removes the notice (or other CMI) having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement (17 U.S.C. §§ 1202 and 1203);
  • It identifies the copyright owner for parties seeking permission to use the work (that is, it can help potential licensees find the owner and may prevent the work from becoming a so-called “orphan work”).

Yet the way that CMS functionality deals with copyright notices ranges from useful, to annoying but workable, to frustrating for all but sophisticated coders. What follows is a discussion of how to provide an accurate copyright notice on web sites managed with a CMS like WordPress. We will first look at typical CMS functionality and then turn to the legal aspects of a proper copyright notice, including the legal and practical benefits of using one.

A CMS like WordPress may provide some mechanism to manually or automatically insert a copyright notice on a web page. The notice might be in a footer or menu that appears with all pages or posts, for instance. But this is not default functionality in WordPress. Rather, the implementation of copyright notices falls to the particular theme used by the WordPress CMS, including a child theme, or to manual insertion by CMS users (including adding text or through coding) or through the use of a CMS plug-in.

Some WordPress themes will insert a copyright notice automatically, often in footer text. But control over that copyright notice might be limited and not particularly straightforward for CMS users uncomfortable with editing code (such as through the WordPress CMS’ theme editor under the “Appearance” menu). This matters because the automatically-inserted copyright notice might be complete wrong! Actually, it probably will be wrong from a copyright law perspective unless you edit the notice in some way. That is because what is often inserted may include a year that automatically updates (and thus has no connection to the dates any particular content experienced “publication” in the legal sense) and may insert automatically the web site’s title as the copyright owner—which may be a brand name rather than a person or corporation that actually owns the relevant copyright(s). Though when they automatically include the copyright symbol “©” or the word “Copyright” that is at least a start.

So the default copyright notices inserted by a CMS may represent good intentions gone awry. Where problems really arise, though, is when CMS users (wrongly) assume that the CMS and theme defaults are based on the requirements of U.S. copyright law. Often, the CMS theme defaults have no basis in copyright law at all.

The right way to format a copyright notice, if one is desired, is addressed below. But purely from the standpoint of using a CMS like WordPress, know that the default copyright notice is probably not correct and will need to be changed. Doing so may not be simple from the standpoint that overriding the default notice established by a theme may not be possible using the CMS’s standard graphical user interface menus. You may need a plugin or have to manually edit the theme’s cascading style sheet (CSS) code.

A potential annoyance here is that unless a plugin or child theme is used to specify the format and content of a copyright notice, be aware that hard-coded changes to a theme’s CSS code used to provide a desired copyright notice (such as in a site-wide footer) will break whenever the theme is updated. So installing theme updates will undo your efforts to hard-code a copyright notice in that theme. This means theme updates might need to be deferred until a CMS user has the time to re-edit the newly-updated theme’s CSS code to reinstate the desired copyright notice.

Keep in mind here that copyright notices can be inserted in all sorts of way for different types of content, and notices that appear in page footers are just one way.

You can generally manually insert copyright notices in the text of individual pages or posts (preferably at the end/bottom). You just need to remember to do it.

You can also insert a copyright notice as a caption or a visible title for a media file. For example, if you have a copyrighted photo, a copyright notice specific to that photo could appear in text adjacent to the photo or overlaid on top of it. Different CMS themes will provide slightly different functionality for doing this. But you can always just put the copyright notice for a photo or graphic in the most nearby text area (preferably at or near the bottom of an image).

Additionally, a copyright notice can be embedded in an image or graphic, such as like a watermark or in a “gutter” area. The advantage of permanently embedding a copyright notice like a watermark in image files is that it cannot be erased easily by a copyist. Though disadvantages are that an embedded copyright notice may obscure the image or create an aesthetically undesired appearance. Sometimes, as a compromise, the notice might appear in a gutter adjoining the perimeter of the photo or graphic, which avoids obscuring the image but still results in a potentially unaesthetic gutter area being visible. Also, a CMS will usually lack built-in functionality to embed a copyright notice in an image file itself. For that, you might turn to an image editing program, like GIMP.

A copyright notice is a statement placed on copies of a work to inform the public that a copyright owner is claiming ownership. A copyright registration is not required in order to utilize a copyright notice. A proper notice (under 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(b) and 402(b)) for a published work consists of three elements that generally appear as a single continuous statement in the following order (in the English language):

  1. The copyright symbol © (the letter C in a circle), the word “copyright”, or the abbreviation “copr.” (or, for phonorecords, the symbol ℗ );
  2. The year of first publication of the work, though in the case of compilations, or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient; and
  3. The name of the copyright owner, or an abbreviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the owner.

This example shows these three elements in a formal copyright notice:

We will look at each of these three elements of the notice in more detail below. Additional guidance about using copyright notices can also be found here.

Although certain old U.S. copyright laws required a copyright notice on published U.S. works in order to preserve copyright ownership, for any work created on or after March 1, 1989 a copyright notice is completely optional. In practical terms, no original (newly created) online materials require a copyright notice to avoid loss of rights because copyright notice requirements were abolished in the USA by the time the World Wide Web and the modern Internet was operational.

Keep in mind that there might be multiple copyright notices provided on a web site. The examples given here are mostly general copyright notices, such as a single notice that appears in the footer of all posts/pages on a site. Though specific copyright notices can be used for specific elements, such as notices directed specifically (and exclusively) toward particular elements. For example, a web site could include multiple specific copyright notices each applicable only to the text, a particular photo, or all illustrations. Specific notices are not usually required, because the law makes any copyright notice optional. But specific notices may be required based on the terms and conditions associated with your use of particular content (such as license or other contractual terms). U.S. copyright law also has certain prohibitions on removal of copyright management information, which is a key reason specific notices might be needed. So multiple (specific) notices are more common when a site uses content owned by someone else.

U.S. copyright laws state that a copyright “notice shall be affixed to the copies in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright.” (17 U.S.C. § 401(c)).

The Register of Copyrights provides some non-exhaustive examples of acceptable placement of a copyright notice in federal regulations. However, no examples are given regarding web site materials or other online works specifically. But the examples given for “machine-readable works” state that the following are acceptable: (i) a notice embodied in the copies in machine-readable form in such a manner that on visually perceptible printouts it appears either with or near the title, or at the end of the work; (ii) a notice that is displayed at the user’s terminal at sign on; and (iii) a notice that is continuously on terminal display. Placement of a notice in a web page footer is likely to be considered “at the end of the work” and therefore is a preferred (and common) location. And, more generally, the regulations say that the acceptability of a “reasonable” notice depends upon its being permanently legible to an ordinary user of the work under normal conditions of use, and on being affixed to copies in such a manner and position that the notice is not concealed from view upon reasonable examination.

The first element needed for a proper copyright notice is the copyright symbol (or phonorecord symbol instead, if applicable), or something recognized as an acceptable alternative. The copyright symbol “©” can either be copied-and-pasted or there are keystrokes that can be used to insert it while typing (these keystrokes vary depending on the computer system being used). Many word processing systems will auto-correct a letter C in parentheses sequence to the copyright symbol, but the WordPress CMS will not. Using the letter C in parentheses, “(C)”, is technically not what the U.S. copyright statutes indicate. However, the U.S. Copyright Office has long considered “(C)” to be one of a few acceptable variants. Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, 3rd Edition, § 2204.4(A).

Year of First Publication

The second element of a copyright notice is the year of first publication of the work. As discussed above at length, what does or does not constitute “publication” under U.S. copyright law is not straightforward. But those considerations are the starting point for the second element of the notice.

The U.S. copyright statutes say that in the case of compilations or derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year of first publication of the compilation or derivative work is sufficient. In other words, for a derivative work such as a newer version of previously-published content, the more recent publication year for the newer version can be used. The same goes for a compilation. A web site that is itself a collective work (in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole) or is a collection and assembling of preexisting materials that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship, is a compilation.

If a work is unpublished, there is no year of first publication. The statutory requirements for the form and content of a copyright notice for a published work don’t apply to an unpublished work. So copyright owners have flexibility to use any form of notice they wish with an unpublished work. Some say that a copyright notice for an unpublished work should indicate the unpublished nature of the work in lieu of a year. Though it is also common for a copyright notice for an unpublished work to include the year of creation instead (even though this could potentially be mistaken for the year of publication unless clarification is provided) or to omit the year element entirely with no indication of unpublished status.

When a web site has a single, general copyright notice in a footer or menu that appears on all pages of the site, it is sometimes common to see a range of years used. This is an attempt to accommodate the fact that the notice encompasses a set of different individual web pages and/or other materials like photos that were published in different years. Though for published works, the use of a date range is not something specified in the statute. If you choose to include a general copyright notice with a range of years, the range should at least be accurate and should encompass the relevant years of publication for any published material that the notice is intended to apply to. Though as noted above, if the web site is a collective work or a compilation (both of those terms are defined in the copyright statutes), then only the year of first publication of the compilation or collective work (and not those of the preexisting works) needs to be specified.

The statute regarding the proper format of copyright notices on (non-phonorecord) copies also includes an odd carve-out. The year (date) in a copyright notice may be omitted “where a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, with accompanying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful articles.” It might be argued that any web site graphical user interface or menu is a “useful article” (having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information) that allows omission of the year of publication, though that is something courts have not yet definitively ruled on (despite numerous opportunities).

The name of the copyright owner (or joint owners) is the third required element for a proper copyright notice. This is an area where mistakes are common, usually because of bad assumptions about who is actually the copyright owner.

First of all, the owner, or joint owners, each need to be either an individual or a juristic entity (like a corporation). A brand name (trademark) or the title of a web site are not juristic entities, any more than a fictional character in a book or movie is one. The owner has to be a person or entity capable of legally owning property. Though a proper copyright notice can include variants, abbreviations, alternative designations, or pseudonyms of the owner’s name, such as such as a legal assumed name or “dba” (doing business as) of a business.

But who is the true owner of a given copyright? This is the part that causes headaches. It might not be clear at all! It might (and often does) require a detailed review of legal provisions in relevant contracts and consideration of the factual context around the creation of the work(s) in question. If the CMS user adding the copyright notice does not know that information or have access to it, then someone else needs to be involved to establish the proper owner name for the notice.

Copyright ownership originally arises in the author(s). If a vendor (or outside contractor) created the web site materials, then the vendor—or the vendor’s employee(s) or subcontractor(s)—would usually be the author and own the copyright in the absence of a written assignment. If an employee created the web site materials within the scope of his or her employment, then the work is a “work made for hire” and the employer is automatically deemed the author and copyright owner. But work made for hire determinations can be difficult. The owner of a small business may not be an employee. And even someone who is an employee may not have created the specific work(s) in question within the scope of his or her employment. If there are agreements in place with a vendor, they may or may not actually transfer ownership of copyright. Sometimes agreements establish only an obligation to assign (such as when they use language referring to future actions, like “will own” or “will assign”), and require a further written assignment to actually transfer copyright ownership. Tracking down copyright ownership information can be time-consuming. Master services agreements might incorporate separate “statement of work” documents that might all need to be reviewed in order to determine who owns what.

As you can see, there is no way for a WordPress theme’s automatic copyright notice settings to accurately reflect assignments, agreements, or employment conditions that were in place in order for the correct copyright owner to be named. Though for a web site run by a single individual who created all its content personally, the owner will be that individual and this question is not as complicated.

Other Information — Restrictions/Exclusions, Terms of Use, Etc.

Although the U.S. copyright statutes specify three elements required for a copyright notice, there might be other information included in addition.

For instance, there might be an exclusion stated. A copyright notice with an exclusion is referred to as a restricted notice. A common one, which stems from a statutory requirement for works consisting predominantly of re-used work(s) of the (federal) U.S. Government (for which there is no copyright), is “No claim to original U.S. Government works.” But there could be others, such as “© 2000 Jane Doe, no copyright claimed in illustrations” or “© 2000 Jane Doe, no copyright claimed in public domain photo.” Generally there is no need to include a restriction or exclusion unless the work is predominantly made up of materials not owned by the entity in the copyright notice.

Different kinds of additional copyright management information can be provided along with the copyright notice too. For instance explicit statements granting certain authorizations or licenses but prohibiting other things—that is, terms and conditions for use of the work—might be specified adjacent to the copyright notice, if desired.

Concluding Remarks

Some of the issues above have to do with the limitations of CMS functionality, including limited copyright notice functionality for many WordPress CMS themes. Other issues stem from the maddeningly convoluted nature of U.S. copyright laws. While adept CMS users can always find away around the limitations of built-in CMS or CMS theme functionality, more novice CMS users may have more difficulty editing the general copyright notice(s) in page/post footers. Though it is always possible to insert specific copyright notices in all sorts of other places.

When it comes to U.S. copyright laws, however, the complexity and confusion comes from the ways the laws were written. Clarifications or simplifications would require legislative changes (and perhaps changes or withdrawal from international treaties). Though bear in mind something Mark Twain wrote: “Whenever a copyright law is to be made or altered, then the idiots assemble.”

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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

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Patents

Is Functional Language Permitted in Patent Claims?

A question that comes up frequently is whether functional language is permitted in patent claims. Sometimes this is called functional claiming. This has long been a fundamental yet unresolved issue in patent law. In general, functional language is permitted in U.S. patents and patent applications. But that does not mean it is always acceptable. The acceptability of functional claim language depends on where and how the functional language is used in a given claim and also on how the functional claim language relates to what was actually invented (and disclosed). These questions are often about whether the applicant/patentee’s intentions behind the particular use of functional claim language are proper or not.

To be clear, functional claiming generally refers to describing something by what it does rather than what it is (structurally). Method claims naturally use functional language. The focus here is on functional language in apparatus claims.

The first question to ask is whether the functional claim language is used to recite the point of novelty—the limitation(s) that purportedly distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art. If not, the use of functional language is much more likely to be acceptable and free from dispute. For instance, using functional language in a claim preamble to highlight intended use (possibly in a non-limiting way) is generally acceptable. Though functional recitations appearing anywhere in a claim could still raise concerns. But the situation is most critical when the functional claim language appears right where the claim purports to recite the point of novelty. Suspicions are often raised when a claim includes many structural recitations related to what was already known in the art but then conveniently switches to functional language when setting forth the point of novelty.

When the functional claim language appears at the point of novelty, further analysis is merited. Some other questions should be asked. Is the functional language an attempt to draft a preemptive claim that covers all possible solutions to a technical problem? Or is the functional language an attempt to claim an entire genus of possible solutions? Those are questions about overbreadth in light of the quid pro quo policy underlying modern patent law. This is a matter of preventing an improper extension of a patent’s scope beyond what was actually invented. Also, does the use of functional render the scope of the claim indefinite? This tends to be a concern about whether the functional language makes the claim’s scope unclear by obfuscating what is or is not encompassed. It also reflects concerns about attempts to circumvent the required “peripheral” claim format and instead utilize “central” claiming; that is, attempting to recite merely a vague central inventive concept without informing those of ordinary skill in the art about the scope (outermost boundaries) of the claimed invention with reasonable certainty.

With regard to questions of claim breadth, functional language must be assessed based upon its meaning within the claim as a whole and in light of the entire disclosure of what was actually invented.  This inquiry involves looking at the particular functional claim language in context to see if it is purely functional language or only partially functional language that is limited by associated structural recitations or by the invocation of means-plus-function format (“means for . . . [a recited function]”) specifically authorized by statute (35 U.S.C. § 112(f)).

For example, consider the claim, “An assembly comprising part A, part B, and a connection between part A and part B, wherein the connection is configured to rigidly fix a base portion of part A to an end of part B.” Such a claim seems acceptable even though the “configured to” language is followed by “rigidly fix” language that might be seen as functional if viewed in isolation. In other words, this example uses partly but not wholly functional claim language. The functional recitations are limited by further structural recitations of part A, part B, and a connection.

On the other hand, consider the claim to an improved widget that recites, “A widget configured to achieve good result X.” Such a claim is not structural but instead uses results-based and purely functional language at the point of novelty to try to claim all solutions to a problem.  This latter claim is preemptive of all possible solutions that “achieve good result X”, even those that have not yet been invented. Claims directed merely to a desired result have long been considered objectionable primarily because they cover any means which anyone may ever discover of producing the stated result.

Also, it is possible to add structural recitations such that the functional language is only partially functional. We can continue here from the last example. Consider an amended claim that recites “A widget configured to achieve good result X, comprising:” as merely the claim preamble, and then proceeds to recite the structure that achieves the “good result X” in the body of the claim, such as “substrate Y; and a coating Z applied to the substrate Y, wherein the coating Z comprises a thermally insulating material containing at least 5% yttria by weight.” That claim would not be purely function because of the functional language in the preamble—we can just assume here that “good result X” has something to do with high temperature operation. In this case, the additional structural recitations in the body of the claim would explain what the invention is (in structural terms) rather than stopping with merely a statement of the result it achieves.

There may also be situations where functional-looking language really has a structural meaning (to a person of ordinary skill in the art). For instance, the portmanteau term “screwdriver”—derived from the German word schraubenzieher (screwpuller) and/or the French word tournevis (turnscrew) from the middle ages—could be seen as functional. But, today, anyone would recognize the word “screwdriver” as referring to a generic name for a kind of tool, in a structural way. If we imagine that a patent claim using the term “screwdriver” was presented in the early middle ages, before there was an accepted structural meaning for that term, such medieval usage could raise concerns about its breadth in relation to what was really invented—would it have also covered a pair of pliers that might be used to grip a screw in order to “drive” it, or a hammer? This example in medieval times would look like purely functional claiming of merely a desired result—driving a screw. Whereas, today, usage of “screwdriver” would be an unremarkable structural reference to a genus of tools (having a tip that can can engage one of the many different types of screw drives, but excluding pliers and hammers).

A patent claim that uses functional language to refer to an entire genus may (or may not) be acceptable. Genus/species issues are also among the most fundamental in patent law. The philosophical idea behind reference to an entire genus is that it encompasses an unknown or unstated species. For a patentee, this is usually the intent! Patentees often want to get the broadest possible monopoly rights, including blocking rights over later inventions. But a key component of modern patent law is that patents should be limited to what the patentee actually invented. So, very often, questions about the use of functional claim language are about the reasonableness of claim scope that goes beyond what was actually invented—or at least what was actually disclosed in a patent application. These questions often turn on the breadth of the disclosure of an invention and whether that disclosure is robust enough to support a claim covering an entire genus or not. Functional claim language is frequently used to recite something like a genus or class rather than merely one or more particular species. A recitation encompassing multiple species may or may not be improper. It is a matter of degree and context.

With regard to enablement requirements, “If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. The more one claims, the more one must enable.” And this is directly tied to the breadth of monopoly the applicant or patentee demands, and whether, commensurate with that demand for a monopoly, the inventor’s disclosure identifies a quality common to every functional embodiment. This means that the acceptability of functional language that effectively claims an entire genus or class rests not only on the claim language but also on the entirety of the disclosure and the level of predictability in the relevant technological field or art.

For instance, these issues often do not turn merely on whether a given claim uses “configured to” vs. “adapted to” vs. “operable to” language (or the like). Though patent attorneys and judges sometimes try to reduce the larger and more fundamental questions to such superficial formalities—sometimes as a matter of “university discourse” (i.e., making highly ideological policy arguments through the guise of seemingly neutral and objective technical rationales). 

With regard to definiteness or clarity concerns, partially functional language is frequently acceptable and might sometimes be more clear and definite than certain alternative types of claim limitations (like a negative limitation). For instance, with a mechanical invention, partially functional claim language used to recite the way certain enumerated structures are connected and moveable—or not movable—relative to each other may be perfectly clear and uncontroversial. But when purely functional claim language is substituted for structural language such that the (purely) functional language entirely displaces structural language, as a way to consciously avoid limiting the scope of the claim to particular structures, then it might not be acceptable. This is more like the “good result X” or medieval “screwdriver” examples given above. It is the broadness, ambiguity, and overhanging threat of purely functional claiming that is problematic. The public cannot tell what does or does not fall within the scope of the purely functional language.

Another legal issue around functional claim language under U.S. patent law is the use of means-plus-function format (under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) or pre-AIA § 112, ¶ 6)—also called step-plus-function format for method/process claims. An applicant can invoke means-plus-function claim format to utilize functional language in the claim, in which case the claim language is construed to cover the corresponding structures, materials, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. A catch is that the specification (including the figures) must provide an adequate disclosure of structure corresponding to the means-plus-function claim language. Means-plus-function format can sometimes be useful to recite known (prior art) elements but with recitations at the point of novelty it is often considered a narrow and less desirable claim format. That is because an equivalent structure for means-plus-function purposes must have been available at the time of the issuance of the claim, but does not extend to after-arising technology developed after the issuance of the patent (except under the the Doctrine of Equivalents, if it applies).

There have been many, many cases that deal with functional claiming. However, U.S. courts have not not definitely and conclusively resolved these issues. That is not really surprising because patent applicants have numerous incentives to try to obtain monopoly rights over more than what they invent.

In the USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences’ (BPAI) precedential case Ex parte Miyazaki (which now seems to stand in conflict with Federal Circuit cases, at least in major part), it was explained that “when [a] limitation encompasses any and all structures or acts for performing a recited function, including those which were not what the applicant had invented, the disclosure fails to provide a scope of enablement commensurate with the scope of the claim . . . .” Such purely functional claim language is unpatentable unless the applicant has given the public notice that the limiting conditions of 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph (now § 112(f)) are being invoked. Therefore, according to Miyazaki, purely functional claim language is unpatentable when it is “unlimited either by (1) the application of 35 U.S.C. § 112[(f)], or (2) the additional recitation of structure.” (emphasis in original).

Where this has been complicated is that the Federal Circuit has (controversially) held that purely functional language that does not use “means for” to explicitly invoke § 112(f) might still be interpreted as means-plus-function language. This stands in contrast to the more convincingly-argued BPAI Miyazaki decision regarding the need for notice to the public regarding invocation of § 112(f) limitations. The Federal Circuit is trying to save applicants from themselves (and potentially from the invalidity or unpatentability of the purely functional claims they chose to pursue) at the expense of the general public’s entitlement to clarity and predictability regarding the scope and validity of patent claims. This is also another example of Federal Circuit hostility to Supreme Court precedent regarding breadth- or preemption-related invalidity issues other than for sliding-scale enablement requirements.

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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

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Patents Q&A

What Are the Ways to Challenge a Granted Patent?

It may be desired to proactively challenge the validity or patentability of a granted U.S. patent for a variety of reasons. What are the available options to challenge a granted patent either at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) or in court? The following table compares the different types of proceedings and summarizes the applicable standards.

————————Post Grant Review (PGR)Inter Partes Review (IPR)Derivation Proceeding (DP)Ex Parte Reexamination (Reexam)District Court Civil Action — Declaratory Judgment (DJ Action)
Eligible Target Patents Based on Effective Filing Date (EFD)AIA patents only: EFD ≥ March 16, 2013Any patent AIA patents only: EFD ≥ March 16, 2013Any patentAny patent
Available Grounds§§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (no best mode), including double patenting§§ 102 and 103 based on patents and printed publications (only)Derived invention without authorization§§ 102 and 103 based on patents and printed publications (only)Any (except best mode)
Timing RequirementsWithin 9 months of patent grant (or reissue)AIA patents: after 9 months (end of PGR)
Non-AIA patents: after issuance
Both: only within 1 year of civil action
Within 1 year of grant or publication of claim, whichever is earlierAnytime patent remains assertableAnytime patent remains assertable
Claim Interpretation StandardSame as district court civil action (Phillips)Same as district court civil action (Phillips)Same as district court civil action (Phillips)Broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) except
Expired patents: Phillips
Markman / Phillips
Eligible Filing PartiesAny 3rd partyAny 3rd partyInventorAnyoneAnyone with standing (substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality; requires affirmative act by patentee)
ThresholdMore likely than not unpatentableReasonable likelihood petitioner will prevailSubstantial evidenceSubstantial new question of patentability (SNQ)Plausibility (Iqbal / Twombly)
Estoppel (Attaching to Challenger)Raised or reasonably could have raisedRaised or reasonably could have raisedNone by statute, but derivation-specific administrative estoppel and deferenceNone by statute, but administrative estoppel and deferenceRes judicata and collateral estoppel (for civil actions only)
Click to download table in PDF format
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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

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Articles

New and Upcoming Developments in U.S. Patent & Trademark Law for 2022

Important Developments to Note

At the beginning of 2022, some recent and upcoming changes in practice at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) for patent and trademark matters merit attention.


Patents

“DOCX” filing format deadline extended

The deadline for the implementation of a surcharge for non-DOCX patent application filings has been extended until January 1, 2023.  In recent years, most U.S. patent applications have been filed electronically in PDF format.  DOCX-format filings are currently possible but non-DOCX PDF-format filings are still permitted without any surcharge.  The non-DOCX surcharge will eventually be $400/$200/$100 for large/small/micro entities.  Note that the non-DOCX surcharge will not apply to PCT national phase entries into the USA. The applicability of the non-DOCX surcharge to U.S. applications filed in a language other than English is still rather unclear (it is not clear if a DOCX copy of only the English translation, only the non-English original, or both the original and translation is required to avoid the surcharge). 

In general, the greatest concerns about DOCX format have to do with rendering of complex application content, such as embedded mathematical equations created with a word processing program’s equation editing functionality, which may not render as the applicant intended at the USPTO side.  The official reason given for the implementation delay is to “provide the public an opportunity to more fully comprehend the nature of, and prepare to comply with, the DOCX format[.]” But while the DOCX format is an administrative convenience for the USPTO, its mandated use is a more of a burden than a benefit for applicants.  The need for applicants and their counsel to review and correct potential USPTO-side DOCX rendering errors (which may occur more frequently than with certain PDF-format filings) may make PDF-format filing and payment of the non-DOCX surcharge preferable in some situations.  Though for applications containing only simple text, without complex or unusual formatting or embedded equations (other than equations inserted as images), DOCX-format filing should not pose any major problems. 

Digital-only patents

Starting sometime in 2022, the USPTO will cease issuing paper patents and will issue digital patents instead.  However, paper “presentation copies” (also called ribbon copies) of patents (on heavy paper with an embossed gold seal and the USPTO Director’s signature) will still be available upon request for a $25 (US) official fee per copy.  The USPTO says that digital patent issuance will speed up the process of issuance after payment of the issue fee, with a target of one week to issuance.  This will shorten the time available to file a divisional or continuation patent application, which must be filed no later than the day of issuance of the parent patent.  Though it has always been—and will remain—a recommended best practice to file any desired divisional/continuation application no later than the date of issue fee payment. 

Bilateral exchange of certified priority documents with EPO ending

The USPTO’s bilateral electronic priority document exchange (PDX) program with the European Patent Office (EPO) is ending.  For any U.S. applications filed on or after January 01, 2022 with a priority claim to an earlier EP application, a WIPO Digital Access Service (DAS) code will need to be provided in order to electronically retrieve a certified copy through PDX.  This will require registering the EP application with the WIPO DAS exchange.  This change will not affect PCT national phase entries into the USA where the EP priority document is made available under PCT Rule 17. 

More U.S. patent filing information

Please also see the “Guide to Foreign Priority Patent Filings in the USA” (available for download as a set of condensed presentation slides titled “Patent Filings in the USA: Important Considerations”) for in-depth discussion of requirements for foreign applicants to file U.S. counterpart patent applications with a foreign priority claim.


Trademarks

“Flexible” (shortened) response periods

Starting December 1, 2022, the time to respond to trademark office actions (under 37 C.F.R. § 2.62(a)) will be shortened to three (3) months.  A single three-month extension of time to respond can be requested, which will carry an official fee of $125 (US).  The extension must be affirmatively requested within the original three-month period.  However, the shortened response periods will not apply to Madrid extensions to the USA.  For refusals in Madrid extension cases (§66), the applicant will still have a full six-month response period available without paying any extension fees.   

Digital-only registration certificates

Starting in spring 2022 the USPTO will cease issuing paper trademark registration certificates and will issue digital certificates instead.  [UPDATE: the USPTO began issuing only electronic registration certificates on May 24, 2022.] However, paper “presentation copy” trademark registration certificates (on heavy paper with an embossed gold foil seal, the name(s) of the owner(s), the mark, bibliographic data, and the classes of goods and/or services) will still be available upon request for a $25 (US) official fee per copy.  Registrants who filed an initial trademark application before the implementation date (a date that is not yet fixed) will be able to order presentation copies with no official fee.  Additionally, certified copies of U.S. trademark registration certificates with current title and status information are also available with payment of an official fee, currently $30 (US).

Filer Identify Verification

[UPDATE: the USPTO has postponed the deadline for filer identity verification to August 6, 2022.] By April 9, 2022, persons filing trademark applications, responses, and the like must complete identity verification in order to electronically file with the USPTO.  These identity verification procedures will be available starting January 8, 2022.

New expungement and reexamination proceedings

Two new proceedings are available for an existing trademark registration to be challenged.  Both of these new proceedings are conducted on an ex parte basis.  That is, a challenger files a petition to request expungement or reexamination and, if granted, the rest of the proceeding is conducted only between the USPTO and the registrant in a manner similar to original examination.  Unlike traditional cancellation (or opposition) proceedings, after institution of an expungement or reexamination proceeding, the challenger cannot substantively participate.  Summaries of the two new proceedings follow, but more details about applicable procedures can be found in the USPTO Examination Guide 1-21.  In addition to the two new types of proceedings, expungement is also available as a new ground for a traditional cancellation proceeding after three years of registration (15 U.S.C. § 1064(6)). 

Expungement proceedings: Any party may request cancellation of some or all of the goods or services in a registration because the registrant never used the mark in commerce with those goods or services.  The official filing fee for an expungement proceeding is currently $400 (US) per class.  An expungement proceeding must be requested in a period from three to ten (3-10) years after the registration date. However, there is currently an extended expungement filing period.  Until December 27, 2023, expungement may be requested for any registration at least three (3) years old, regardless of the ten-year limit.  In other words, the ten-year time limit for expungement proceeding requests will only go into effect after December 27, 2023.  Expungement proceedings are available for all registrations but will be especially significant for foreign-originating registrations (Madrid [§66] or Paris Convention [§44] cases) where proof of use is not required to initially obtain a U.S. registration. 

Reexamination proceeding: Any party may request cancellation of some or all of the goods or services in a use-based registration on the basis that the trademark was not in use in commerce with those goods or services on or before either (1) the application filing date (when the underlying application was initially filed based on use of the trademark in commerce under §1(a)) or (2) the later of the date that an amendment to allege use was filed or the date that the deadline to file a statement of use expired (when the underlying application was filed with an intent-to-use basis under §1(b)).  Reexamination proceedings are available for registrations under 15 U.S.C. §1051 (§1) but are not available for marks registered under the Paris Convention (§44) or the Madrid protocol (§66).  The official filing fee for a reexamination proceeding is currently $400 (US) per class.  Reexamination must be requested within the first five (5) years after registration.

More U.S. trademark filing information

Please also see this “Filing Guide for Trademark Registration in the USA” for in-depth discussion of requirements for foreign applicants to file U.S. federal trademark applications.


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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

Categories
Q&A Trademarks

How Can a Brand Be Protected as a Trademark?

Trademarks (and service marks) serve to identify a particular source of a product or service. The purpose of trademark law is tied to that source-identifying function. Trademark rights arise through use. Registration is optional. What matters most in terms of a brand eligibility for trademark protection is its strength or distinctiveness, together with any any prior conflicting uses of identical or similar brands already taken by others.

Generally, a brand can be protected under trademark law if it is distinctive enough to serve such a source-identifying function—and it is actually used for that purpose. There is a continuum of kinds of marks that separates distinctive ones capable of exclusive rights and ones that are not distinctive and do not entitle the user to any exclusive rights. The possibility of exclusive trademark rights depends first of all upon selecting a mark that is distinctive enough. Doing that properly requires some understanding of the strength continuum of mark distinctiveness.

Continuum of trademark strength/distinctiveness
Pyramid Illustration of the Strength Continuum of Marks

Brands and marks are categorized along the following range or continuum of increasing conceptual distinctiveness: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, or (5) fanciful. A mark that is fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive is considered to be inherently distinctive and automatically is eligible for federal trademark protection—long ago these were referred to as technical trademarks. While these categories are well-established now, there may be dispute as to where any given mark falls on this continuum. Changes in how a mark is used over time can also complicate these determinations.

A fanciful mark is a non-dictionary word concocted by the user. These are sometimes referred to a coined marks. Some examples are EXXON® for petroleum and petroleum products, and many pharmaceutical brands that are completely made-up names.

An arbitrary mark is a known word used in an unexpected or uncommon way. An example is APPLE® for computers.

A suggestive mark is one for which a consumer must use imagination or any type of multistage reasoning to understand the mark’s significance. A suggestive mark does not directly describe features of the product or service but instead suggests them. Example are ESKIMO PIE® for frozen confections and KITCHENAID® for small household devices and utensils.

Descriptive terms define qualities or characteristics of a product in a straightforward way that requires no exercise of the imagination to be understood. Merely descriptive terms are not entitled to trademark protection. Only marks that have acquired secondary meaning through extensive and substantially exclusive use over a sufficient period of time attain acquired distinctiveness to potentially be protectable as trademarks. Simply being the first to use a descriptive term is not enough. An example of a merely descriptive term is “cotton” for t-shirts made at least partly from cotton, or the term “large” to describe the size of the t-shirt. An example of a descriptive mark that has acquired secondary meaning in the USA is AMERICAN AIRLINES® for air transport of passengers and freight.

Generic terms are what the public understands to be the common names of associated products or services. Another way of stating this definition is that a generic term denotes a category (genus) of goods/services of which a particular brand is one species. A generic term does not signal any particular source and can never serve as a protectable mark under trademark law. Usage and advertising can never make a generic term protectable. Some examples of generic terms are “breakfast cereal” or “television” for those same goods. Some terms that were at one time protectable can also become generic, such as “escalator” for moving walkways.

The distinctiveness of a mark depends on how it is being used. The same mark might fall in different distinctiveness categories in different contexts. For example, the mark APPLE® may be arbitrary when used to identify a source of computers but “apple” is generic when applied to the fruit widely known by that name.

When it comes to trade dress, a form of trademark protection, functional aspects are not protectable. In this sense, functional aspects of things themselves are treated like generic terms—alone they are ineligible for trademark protections. An example of a functional feature is the shape of a key that allows it to fit into a corresponding lock.

A “trade name” is somewhat different from a trademark. A trade name is the formal legal name of a corporate entity, or its formal assumed name (DBA). For instance, “Acme, Inc.” a hypothetical corporation registered in a particular U.S. state, is a trade name. While it is possible that such a company sells ACME or ACME, INC. brand widgets, it might instead sell EXAMPLE brand widgets. Trade name and trademark usage may not be the same. There tend to be different (and less stringent) legal standards applied to securing trade names than to securing trademark rights. A common mistake is to believe that forming a corporation or registering an assumed name with a state—alone—creates trademark rights, when trademark rights in the U.S. require both use of the mark (as a mark) and a sufficient level of distinctiveness.

Also keep in mind that registering an Internet domain name does not by itself establish any trademark rights. While the availability of a suitable domain name is often an important consideration when selecting and adopting a brand, domains can be registered without regard for the use and distinctiveness requirements that apply to trademarks. Moreover, using a domain URL merely as an Internet address is not the same as trademark use as a source identifier.

When selecting a mark, it is common for businesses to gravitate toward conceptually weak marks as brands because they “sell themselves” and are immediately recognized by consumers for what those marks represent. So there is less investment required at the outset to establish consumer recognition of the brand. But some things are too weak to even function as marks and will not be protectable at all. Selecting a merely descriptive term as a brand will not allow for any exclusive rights unless and until secondary meaning (acquired distinctiveness) is achieved over a significant period of time. But even descriptive marks that have acquired distinctiveness are still subject to descriptive fair use defenses that limit the scope of exclusivity. And a generic term is never entitled to exclusivity, regardless of usage or advertising effort. Anyone who wants to have exclusive rights in a brand needs to select a mark that is distinctive enough to merit trademark protection.

Also, trademark strength can actually be assessed in different ways, to refer to either protectability or scope of exclusivity. There is inherent or conceptual strength, which categorizes how a mark naturally is or is not capable of serving as a source identifier. That is about protectability, and whether there can be any exclusive rights for a given mark when used with particular goods/services. But there is also commercial or marketplace strength, which refers to the level of exclusive use as a brand by a particular entity (secondary meaning). That is generally about the scope of exclusive rights. For instance, a suggestive mark may be conceptually/inherently strong (distinctive) enough to be protectable, but if there are many other entities using similar marks due to similar suggestive connotations then the commercial strength and degree (scope) of exclusivity in the coexisting marks is lessened. Likewise, a fanciful/coined term may be conceptually strong as a mark but may still be commercially weak if its usage has been limited in duration and there has been negligible advertising.

Lastly, recognize as well that many marks are already taken by others, which limits the universe of marks freely available for another business’ use at the time of adoption.   It is not unusual for a first-choice mark (and second-choice…) to be already taken. Conducting a legal clearance when adopting a brand is recommended to avoid conflicts with someone else’s preexisting trademark rights.

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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

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Articles

The Delicious Ironies of Food Product Configuration Protection

The Scope and Limits of Trade Dress and Patent Protection in Product Shapes: Food Product Case Studies

Intellectual property (IP) protection for product configurations of comestibles, confections, foodstuffs, and the like have been a matter of dispute in courts for well over a century. A variety of distinct IP rights may be invoked in this context, among them design patents and trade dress (either as a registered or unregistered trademark). Courts have grappled with the limits of such IP rights, seeking to prevent end-runs around the expiration of patent and copyright rights that the U.S. Constitution restricts to only limited times.[i] Such limits on IP rights embody long-standing Anglo-American legal principles in place since the Statute of Monopolies curbed the English Crown’s practice of granting “odious” monopolies over common commodities to raise funds or bestow favor.[ii] Cases up to the present highlight continued aggressive assertions of trade dress rights by foodstuff manufacturers—coupled with pushback by courts to deny trade dress rights in purely functional product configurations.

A number of important historical decisions observed the tendency for assertions of trade dress in (food) product configurations/shapes/forms/designs—these terms being used somewhat interchangeably—to inappropriately extend monopoly protections after a patent expired. Judge Learned Hand authored Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., which dealt with alleged trade dress infringement of the shape of shredded wheat biscuits after the expiration of a design patent to the same biscuit shape.[iii] He wrote that “the plaintiff’s formal dedication of the design [upon expiration of U.S. Des. Pat. No. 24,688] is conclusive reason against any injunction based upon the exclusive right to that form, however necessary the plaintiff may find it for its protection.”[iv]

Front page of U.S. Design Patent No. 24,688

Later, the Supreme Court weighed in on a dispute between Kellogg and Nabisco, finding the pillow shape of a shredded wheat biscuit to be functional because “the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other form were substituted for the pillow-shape.”[v] The Court stated,

“The plaintiff has not the exclusive right to sell shredded wheat in the form of a pillow-shaped biscuit — the form in which the article became known to the public. That is the form in which shredded wheat was made under the basic [utility] patent [U.S. Pat. No. 548,086]. The patented machines used were designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuits. And a design patent [U.S. Des. Pat. No. 24,688] was taken out to cover the pillow-shaped form. Hence, upon expiration of the patents the form . . . was dedicated to the public.”[vi]

Kellogg has remained the touchstone for cases on the limits of trade dress protection, and not just for foodstuffs. Subsequent decisions have elaborated on the non-functionality doctrine without changing the basic framework.[vii]

In a more modern case, Sweet Street Desserts, a “Blossom Design” for a round, single-serving, fruit-filled pastry with six folds or petals of upturned dough was held to be functional and, accordingly, unprotectable as trade dress because the product’s size, shape, and six folds or petals of upturned dough were all essential to the product’s ability to function as a single-serving, fruit-filled dessert pastry.[viii] Only incidental, arbitrary, or ornamental product features that identify the product’s source are protectable as trade dress. Chudleigh’s trade dress Reg. No. 2,262,208 was cancelled.[ix]

Trade Dress Reg. No. 2,262,208

In Ezaki Glico v. Lotte, the non-functionality requirement was assessed in connection with Ezaki Glico’s POCKY® treats—thin, rod- or stick-shaped cookies partially coated in chocolate (with optional nuts)—and Lotte’s competing PEPERO® treats.[x]

The core dispute was how to define “functional” for product configuration trade dress. Ezaki Glico argued a narrow reading, equating “functional” with “essential.” The court disagreed, reading Supreme Court precedent to say that product configuration features need only be useful to be functional. That is, a product shape feature is “useful” and thus “functional” if the product works better in that shape, including shape features that make a product cheaper or easier to make or use. The 3rd Circuit held that a product feature being “essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article”[xi] is merely one way to establish functionality.[xii] A product feature is also unprotectably functional if exclusivity would put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage.[xiii] The rejection of a narrow reading of the functionality doctrine echoes cases in other circuits characterizing the Supreme Court’s TrafFix case as setting forth two ways to establish functionality.[xiv] There are several ways to establish functionality that are not limited to merely “essential” product features.

Functionality in the trade dress context is commonly assessed through the following types of non-dispositive evidence, as summarized in Ezaki Glico:

“First, evidence can directly show that a feature or design makes a product work better…. Second, it is ‘strong evidence’ of functionality that a product’s marketer touts a feature’s usefulness. Third, ‘[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are functional.’ Fourth, if there are only a few ways to design a product, the design is functional. But the converse is not necessarily true: the existence of other workable designs is relevant evidence but not independently enough to make a design non-functional.”[xv]

There was evidence of practical functions of holding, eating, sharing, or packing the POCKY treats. Ezaki Glico’s internal documents showed a desire to have a portion of the stick uncoated by chocolate to serve as a handle. The court also noted how the size of the sticks allowed people to eat them without having to open their mouths wide and made it possible to place many sticks in a package. Ads for POCKY treats also emphasized the same useful features. Ezaki Glico proffered nine examples of partially chocolate-coated treats that do not look like POCKY treats, but the court found that evidence insufficient to avoid the conclusion that every aspect of POCKY treats is useful.

Finally, the court concluded that Ezaki Glico’s utility patent U.S. Pat. No. 8,778,428 for a “Stick-Shaped Snack and Method for Producing the Same” was irrelevant. The court’s rationale for that conclusion, however, is rather unconvincing. The utility patent was applied for in 2007, with a 2006 Japanese priority claim, which was long after Ezaki Glico began selling POCKY treats in the U.S. in 1978, and also long after Lotte began selling the accused PEPERO treats in 1983 and the first explicit allegations of misconduct in 1993. That patent was also still in force (i.e., unexpired). The utility patent corresponded to an “ultra thin” version of POCKY treats and Ezaki Glico argued that its patent addressed only one of many embodiments covered by its trade dress.

The lower court discussed utility patent disclosures regarding stick warping formulated like a problem-solution statement[xvi]—somewhat akin to inventive step (obviousness) analyses in European patent practice. But unmentioned was how the patent’s disclosed stick holder necessarily produces a partial chocolate coating.[xvii] The 3rd Circuit’s reasoning about the irrelevance of the utility patent is superficial to the point of being mere tautology. The appellate opinion did not address Kellogg’s statement that the form in which a food article was made under an expired “basic” patent was relevant to trade dress eligibility or other circuits’ cases that deemed a prior manufacturing method patent to be relevant. Moreover, the court did not address the way mere descriptiveness of just one good bars registration of a trademark for an entire group of goods encompassing additional, different goods.[xviii] Whether a later-filed patent can ever provide grounds to cancel an earlier trade dress registration for functionality is a question the court essentially avoided deciding.

Something else not discussed in Ezaki Glico was the 3rd Circuit’s decision nearly a century ago in the Eskimo Pie case.[xix] There, the validity of U.S. Pat. No. 1,404,539 on the original ESKIMO PIE® chocolate-covered ice cream treat was at issue. The court held the utility patent invalid, reasoning with regard to claim 6 (in which the core and casing form a “substantially rectangular solid adapted to maintain its original form during handling”) that “[t]here is no invention in merely changing the shape or form of an article without changing its function except in a design patent.”[xx] The rectangular solid shape was found non-functional and therefore unable to distinguish the prior art in a utility patent claim. The lower court had already pithily reached these same conclusions:

“The gist of the invention, if there be one, is in sealing a block of ice cream in a sustaining and self-retaining casing of chocolate. A rectangular piece of ice cream is coated with chocolate…. All that the patentee does is to take a small brick of ice cream and coat it with chocolate, just as candies are coated. [In the prior art,] Val Miller took a round ball of ice cream and coated it, just as candies are coated. In one case the ice cream is round in form, and in the other case it is rectangular. In both cases there is a sustaining and self-retaining casing, sealing the core of ice cream…. There is no invention in form alone.”[xxi]

Front page of U.S. Patent No. 1,404,539
U.S. Pat. No. 1,404,539

In a fascinating Wired article from 2015, Charles Duan located correspondence with the inventor’s patent attorney and other pertinent historical information in museum archives.[xxii] Duan highlighted how the invention, if anything, was really about the particular formulation of chocolate that allowed it to work effectively as a coating on a frozen ice cream treat, while the patent contains no disclosure in that regard and its claims were intended to be preemptive.[xxiii] Invalidation of the ESKIMO PIE patent opened the door for the KLONDIKE® ice cream treat, introduced in 1928, which was later the subject of an 11th Circuit trade dress case about product packaging (as opposed to product configuration) for a wrapper with a pebbled texture, images of a polar bear and sunburst, bright coloring, and square size that, in combination, were held non-functional.[xxiv]

Courts have tended to be more lenient on (food) packaging trade dress when it comes to functionality.[xxv] This held true when the 11th Circuit later found the unregistered product design of DIPPIN’ DOTS® multi-colored flash-frozen ice cream spheres/beads to be functional and thus ineligible for trade dress protection.[xxvi] An unexpired utility patent (U.S. Pat. No. 5,126,156)—later held invalid and unenforceable[xxvii]—was specifically cited as evidence of functionality of the product design, along with judicial notice that certain colors connote ice cream flavor.[xxviii]

So, in 1929, the 3rd Circuit ruled that the configuration of an ESKIMO PIE treat was ornamental and non-functional, and therefore unpatentable in a utility patent; whereas, in 2021, the Third Circuit ruled that the configuration of a POCKY treat was functional, and therefore ineligible for trade dress protection. How can these decisions be reconciled?

The only way to square these cases is to say that “functionality” in the trade dress context means something legally different than in the patent context. So, an ice cream treat’s shape/configuration was insufficiently functional to support a utility patent claim though a cookie treat’s shape and configuration was too functional (useful) to support trade dress protection. But courts and other commentators often stop well short of explaining why “functionality” differs in these two contexts, or what specific evidence would differ—aside from the separate need to prove inherent or acquired distinctiveness to establish trade dress rights.[xxix]

The ultimate conclusions in the two cases, however, are very consistent in seeking to limit overreaching IP assertions. The functionality doctrine for trade dress has long been used to scrutinize attempts to secure a potentially perpetual trademark monopoly on product feature(s) that consumers desire in the product itself apart from any unique but optional source-identifying function(s) of product configuration—as well as manufacturers’ concerns about ease and cost of manufacturability. In the patent context, utility requirements at least implicitly revolve around the technological arts rather than aesthetic, saleability, and product source identification concerns—those might be called functions but they are not the type of inventive functions that are eligible for utility patent protection.

But the courts have yet to make explicit the precise role, if any, of the relevant consumer’s perspective in this analysis, which would seem to be a legitimate inquiry in the trade dress context in a way it would not be in the utility patent context, for instance. Admittedly, the “ordinary observer” test used for infringement of design patents blurs this distinction somewhat, especially given that one appeals court has held that conflation of the trademark likelihood-of-confusion test and the design patent ordinary-observer test is harmless error.[xxx] But evidence of non-reputational consumer desires, such as a consumer survey or similar expert testimony, would appear to be rather unique to product configuration trade dress considerations and in closer cases might not always be answered or rendered unnecessary by the admissions or conduct of the alleged trade dress owner.

Certainly, many trade dress product configuration cases do turn on admissions or statements (such as ads) by the owner that indicate functionality or the failure of the owner to meaningfully rebut the persuasive articulation of functionality readily observable in the product itself. Additionally, parties aggressively enforcing trade dress have often also pursued or obtained another form of protection, such as a patent, and statements made in (or during the prosecution of) a patent on the same or similar subject matter can be relevant to trade dress functionality.[xxxi] The Supreme Court has gone so far as to explicitly note that invoking trademark rights as patent rights expire is suspicious enough to create “a strong implication” the party is seeking to improperly extend a patent monopoly and that summary disposition of anticompetitive strike suits is desirable.[xxxii] This means consumer surveys or the like should not become routinely necessary. Yet cases may arise where consumer perceptions of functionality (or usefulness) are not immediately apparent from the product configuration itself, or the plaintiff has not made damaging statements, making survey evidence informative in the absence of more straightforward grounds for assessing functionality. This seems like a potential additional (fifth) category of functionality evidence not spelled out in cases like Ezaki Glico.

Conclusion

Foodstuff product configuration trade dress disputes provide an excellent case study of how courts have sought to preserve consumer access to functional product features, as well as producer access to easy and economical manufacturing techniques. After all, the purpose of trademark law in general is supposed to be about helping consumers identify whether something originates from company A or company B, for instance, but it is not meant to give anyone a monopoly on that something itself. Unless product configurations are relatively easily avoided by competitors making basically the same products, assertions of trade dress protection in pure product configurations have often been rejected. While courts remain sensitive to potential confusion over a product’s source, valid product configuration trade dress rights, as a matter of branding, should include a prominent, non-functional feature related to reputation that does not significantly diminish consumer enjoyment or ease of manufacturability.[*]

A version of this article previously appeared in Bench & Bar of Minnesota Magazine Digital Edition Vol. LXXVIII No. XI (December 2021).

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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.


Endnotes:

[i] U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

[ii] See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); Darcy v. Allein, 11 Co. Rep. 84, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K. B. 1603).

[iii] Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918).

[iv] Id. at 964.

[v] Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, “The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis,” Intellectual Property Stories (Dreyfuss and Ginsburg, eds., Foundation Press, 2005).

[vi] Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120-21; see also “Henry Perky: Patents,” Wikipedia (last visited Jan. 7, 2021); U.S. Des. Pat. No. 48,001.

[vii] See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28-32 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-16 (2000); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771,775 (1992); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-32 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); see also Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., Inc., 326 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1945).

[viii] Sweet Street Desserts, Inc. v. Chudleigh’s Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 3d 530, 532-33 and 546-50 (E.D. Pa. 2014) aff’d 655 F. App’x 103 (3d Cir. 2016); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

[ix] Sweet Street Desserts, Inc. v. Chudleigh’s Ltd., No. 5:12-cv-03363 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2015) aff’d 655 F. App’x 103.

[x] Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp., 986 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2021) cert denied 595 U.S. ___ (Nov. 1, 2021).

[xi] Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850, n.10).

[xii] Ezaki Glico, 986 F.3d at 257; accord PIM Brands Inc. v. Haribo of Am. Inc., No. 22-2821 (3d Cir. Sept. 7, 2023) (alleged trade dress of wedge shape and red/white/green color scheme made watermelon candy identifiable and reminiscent of a watermelon wedge and was therefore functional and unprotectable, with Principal Register registration ordered to be cancelled; “[f]unctionality is not a high bar” and “[e]ven if the design chosen both promotes a brand and also ‘makes a product work better,’ it is functional and unprotectable.” (citing Ezaki Glico, 986 F.3d at 258)); cf. Sulzer Mixpac AG v. A&N Trading Co., 988 F.3d 174, 182-84 (2d Cir. 2021) (color-coding to denote size of dental mixing tips improved the operation of the goods, which affects their quality, and therefore was functional and unprotectable as trade dress even though not essential).

[xiii] Ezaki Glico, 986 F.3d at 257 (quoting TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32).

[xiv] Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Dist., LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203 (11th Cir. 2004); Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 506-09 (6th Cir. 2013); Schutte Bagclosures Inc. v. Kwik Lok Corp., 193 F. Supp. 3d 245, 261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) aff’d 699 F. App’x 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2017).

[xv] Ezaki Glico, 986 F.3d at 258 (internal citations omitted); but see James J. Aquilina, “Non-Functional Requirement for Trade Dress: Does Your Circuit Allow Evidence of Alternative Designs?” AIPLA (May 5, 2020).

[xvi] Ezaki Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp., No. 2:15-cv-05477, 2019 WL 8405592 at *6 (D.N.J., 7/31/2019).

[xvii] See holder (61), which holds one end of stick-shaped pastries (40) while (only) the other end is immersed in a container (62) of liquid coating material (e.g., chocolate). U.S. Pat. No. 8,778,428, FIG. 5 and col. 5, lines 15-18 & 45-50.

[xviii] See TMEP §1209.01(b) (Oct. 2018).

[xix] Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Levous, 35 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1929).

[xx] Id. at 122; see also, e.g., E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Ents., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 286, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1961); James Heddon’s Sons v. Millsite Steel & Wire Works, 128 F.2d 6, 13 (6th Cir. 1942).

[xxi] Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Levous, 24 F.2d 599, 599-600 (D. N.J. 1928).

[xxii] Charles Duan, “Ice Cream Patent Headache,” Wired (Oct. 20, 2015).

[xxiii] Id.; cf., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 223-24 (2014); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73 (2012).

[xxiv] AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535-38 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), abrogated by Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216, but see The Islay Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983, 990-92 (M.D. Fla. 1985).

[xxv] E.g., Spangler Candy Co. v. Tootsie Roll Inds., LLC, 372 F. Supp. 3d 588, 604 (N.D. Ohio 2019); Fiji Water Co., LLC v. Fiji Mineral Water USA, LLC, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172-76 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

[xxvi] Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1202-07; see also 15 U.S.C. §1125(a)(3). The court incorrectly stated unregistered product configuration trade dress can be inherently distinctive, a position abrogated by Wal-Mart.

[xxvii] Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey., 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

[xxviii] Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1205-06.

[xxix] See Keystone Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Jaccard Corp., No. 03-CV-648, 2007 WL 655758 (W.D.N.Y., Feb. 26, 2007).

[xxx] Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 909 F.3d 1110, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (calling the standards “analogous”).

[xxxi] TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29-32; Dippin’ Dots, 369 F.3d at 1205-06.

[xxxii] Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 181 (1896); Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213-14; see also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (misuse of patent on machine to restrain unpatented salt tablet sales); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (improper trademark law false designation of origin assertion after copyright expiration); EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63-54 (2d Cir. 2000) (“musical composition cannot be protected as its own trademark” because “[t]he creation and expression of an original work is protected by copyright law, and once an original work has been produced trademark law is not the proper means of protecting the rights in this originality”; declining to rule “that a product itself—in this case, the song—can serve as its own trademark”); Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1929) (election of protection doctrine bars copyright after obtaining patent: “An inventor who has applied for and obtained a patent cannot extend his monopoly by taking out a copyright . . . on what he has already diagrammatically disclosed”) accord Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 642 (2d Cir. 1958) (“grant of a patent presupposed a dedication to the public of the disclosure, except so far as the statute specifically reserved it to the patentee”).

[*] For European perspectives on functionality issues for trade dress, see Megan Rae Blakely, “KitKat Lost Its Trade Mark Case: What You Need to Know,” The Conversation (July 31, 2018); Kirsti Knolle and Silke Koltrowitz, “Lindt Chocolate Bunny Hops Towards Victory in Trademark Battle,” Reuters (July 29, 2021); César J. Ramírez-Montes, “The Elusive Distinctivenes of Trade Dress in EU Trademark Law,” 34 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 277 (2020); see also Michiel Rijsdijk, “The Netherlands’ Tripp Trapp Chair Saga,” INTA Bulletin, Vol. 76, Issue 30 (Aug. 4, 2021).

Categories
Agreements Copyrights Patents Q&A Trade Secrets

Who Owns the IP for Things a Vendor Creates?

Introduction — Why This Matters

Businesses often hire vendors to develop things for them, perhaps due to a lack of expertise in some particular area or just a lack of capacity.  The vendor might be another firm, an individual independent freelancer, a temporary contractor working on-site, or some other type of consultant. This is often referred to as outsourcing. But who owns the intellectual property (IP) for things the vendor creates? This question should be asked at the beginning of a vendor relationship. Ideally, it should be answered before hiring the vendor.

All too often businesses ignore ownership of IP rights until there is infringement or a big business deal long after the vendor was hired. But cutting corners or forgetting to put IP ownership in writing at the beginning of a vendor relationship can potentially have huge (if avoidable) consequences later on. Businesses do come to regret such oversights later on. For instance, when selling a business, a prospective buyer might raise questions about lack of IP ownership due to vendor or outside contractor involvement, which might present barriers to completing the sale or might lower the purchase price. Or, when there is infringement, a business lacking ownership will not have standing to sue the infringer while the vendor (who still owns the IP) may be unconcerned and disinterested.

A common mistake is to wrongly assume that merely paying a vendor automatically transfers IP ownership or that receiving physical copies (even the sole original) transfers IP ownership. In the absence of something in writing, the vendor most likely retains any patent or copyright ownership interests. Vendors, for their part, may also be ignorant or misinformed about IP rights. Anyone hiring a vendor should not assume that the vendor understands potential IP issues or that the vendor’s standard agreement (sometimes called a master services agreement) will adequately or satisfactorily address and allocate IP ownership.

Type of IPDefault Owner (Subject to Exceptions)
PatentsInventor(s)
CopyrightsAuthor(s)
TrademarksUser of mark (to designate source)
Trade SecretsRightful owner
Table Summarizing Who Typically Owns IP Initially (In the Absence of an Agreement or Local Law to the Contrary)

Seeking to obtain IP rights from a vendor after the end of the relationship can be difficult. You may find yourself without leverage to insist upon vendor cooperation or the vendor may no longer exist (or be deceased).  And vendors may opportunistically seek windfalls to assign over IP rights after-the-fact.  In worst-case scenarios, the vendor may own the IP and be able to freely commercialize it to your disadvantage, as well as to potentially block further independent development by you.

From the vendor’s perspective, an assignment of IP rights might be undesirable. But this is a question of leverage (bargaining power) and whether the vendor is willing and able to turn down potential new work. Though a suitable compromise may be to provide a license-back to a vendor, allowing certain uses by the vendor while still transferring IP ownership to the vendor’s client. An example is a portfolio license allowing the vendor to show examples of past work to potential clients. What makes sense in any particular situation will vary, of course.

Patents and Copyrights

For patents and copyrights, the general rule in the United States is that whoever creates the IP is the owner.  In the absence of a written agreement to the contrary, this means that a vendor will generally own any patent rights or copyrights stemming from the vendor’s own efforts by default, even if the customer paid the vendor for it.  But there are exceptions.  And it is possible to agree in advance who will own the IP — that generally needs to be in writing. 

“For patents and copyrights, the general rule in the United States is that whoever creates the IP is the owner.”

By statute, transfer of ownership of patents (or a patentable invention) and copyrights must be in writing — though copyright law allows the copyright owner’s duly authorized agent to sign an assignment. Any written document, including purely electronic materials, could include or constitute an assignment if it shows intent to presently transfer ownership rights. The written document should use words like “assigns”, “hereby assigns”, “hereby conveys, transfers, and assigns”, etc. to create a present transfer of ownership. Oral assurances will not transfer ownership of an invention (patent) or copyright; although limited implied non-exclusive licenses or equitable rights (e.g., shop rights) might still arise without being in writing. 

Agreements that constitute merely an obligation to assign — typically phrased in the future tense such as with “will own” or “shall assign” language — do not effectuate an assignment of IP. Rather, obligations to assign require later execution of a separate written assignment. But ambiguous language relating to possible future agreements (such as “shall be owned as agreed upon”) may not even create an obligation to assign.

Some jurisdictions have different default rules about IP ownership. At least one U.S. state, Nevada, may vest initial ownership of patent rights with the inventor’s employer rather than the inventor by statute. Under common law, a “hired to invent” doctrine may affect patent ownership too, in limited scenarios. Some other countries also have laws that place ownership of an invention in the hands of the employer rather than the inventor. Though sometimes these laws establish only an obligation to assign. It is important to consider the location of the vendor, the location(s) of the individuals involved, and the location(s) were relevant activities took place to determine which jurisdiction’s laws will apply.

Joint development may also result in joint ownership.  If the vendor and your business collaborate to jointly develop IP, by default they are each the owner of an equal and undivided interest in the entire IP right(s).  Under the patent laws, in the absence of an agreement, co-owners can each independently exploit the invention without an accounting to the other (though all co-owners must join a lawsuit to have standing to sue an accused infringer).  Under copyright case law, an accounting is due to the other co-owner(s) for profits arising from the jointly-owned work to prevent unjust enrichment.  Joint development agreements or the like can set forth various ownership rights in advance and can also govern the handling of relevant pre-existing “background” IP.

All the above concerns also apply to vendors themselves.  For patents, an invention by a vendor’s employee is generally not automatically owned by the vendor.  And if a vendor retains a subcontractor or non-employee then copyright ownership would likely initially vest in the subcontractor/non-employee creating a given work in the absence of an assignment or valid work made for hire agreement.  Therefore, in the absence of a warranty relating to the vendor’s ownership of IP and/or a no-subcontracting contractual provision, or intimate knowledge of the circumstances involved in the creation of the IP, there is no assurance that an assignment from the vendor (alone) will transfer all IP ownership to you. 

“Work Made for Hire”

An important potential exception to initial ownership under U.S. copyright law involves oft-misunderstood “work made for hire” statutory provisions.  There are two, and only two, ways to qualify something as a work made for hire under current law. First, a copyrightable work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment is deemed authored by and thus automatically owned from the outset by the employer.  But vendors and even “internal” independent contractors do not fall within that definition. 

Second, parties without an employee/employer relationship can also agree in writing that a work will be a “work made for hire” but only for nine categories of uses of works enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which may not apply—parties cannot contractually expand those statutory categories. 

A “work made for hire” is-

(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or

(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use [i] as a contribution to a collective work, [ii] as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, [iii] as a translation, [iv] as a supplementary work [see definition below], [v] as a compilation, [vi] as an instructional text, [vii] as a test, [viii] as answer material for a test, or [ix] as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.

Definition of copyright “work made for hire” from 17 U.S.C. § 101

The “work made for hire” doctrine is frequently misunderstood. In practice, it might even be single the most misapplied and confusing provision in all IP law. Simply because you pay someone to make or provide something copyrightable is not enough. And even having a contract that purports to establish something a work made for hire may not actually achieve that goal. It is fairly common for contracts to include language about work made for hire that does not apply and has no legal effect. Only things that meet the statutory definition of “work made for hire” are legally effective.

Because the statute defines categories of possible works made for hire by a somewhat arbitrary and limited list, which is based on “use” rather than the inherent characteristics of the work, it may be difficult to know upfront if something will qualify with certainty. For instance, if a vendor is specially commissioned to write some text, that text could qualify as a work made for hire if commissioned for use as an “instructional text” but the identical text would not if instead commissioned for use in a novel or on an advertising billboard. Moreover, whether vendor-created software source code qualifies as “a contribution to a collective work” and/or “a compilation”, and was intended to be used in that manner, may be far from clear, particularly before any work begins. And agreements, on their face, may not clarify these crucial facts.

A work made for hire not only affects who owns the work but also who is considered the author. This can potentially be significant for copyright termination rights. The persons(s) who actually prepare a work made for hire have no termination rights, whereas person(s) who assign rights to a work can potentially invoke terminate prior assignment transfers (or licenses) decades later.

For older works, created before the 1976 Copyright Act, a much different “instance and expense” test was applied to determine who is the copyright owner. Under that older test, which is inapplicable to recently-created works but can still apply to old works, the commissioning or hiring party may be treated as an “employer” and thus the “author” and copyright owner for things a vendor or outside contractor creates—regardless of the type of intended use of the work.

Trade Secrets

The rightful owner of trade secret rights will be the party that develops the trade secret information, by default. This means technical know-how, etc. developed independently by a vendor will normally belong to the vendor.  It may be unclear whether relevant trade secrets were part of “background” IP that pre-dated a relationship with the vendor or not, which can potentially become a point of dispute later on.  But a written agreement can be used to establish intended trade secret ownership from the outset. 

On the other hand, confidential information developed by a vendor might lose trade secret status if shared with a client business (or others) without reasonable measures to maintain secrecy. This might limit or prevent a vendor from attempting to assert trade secret rights against its client and/or its client’s customers, particularly if there was no non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or other enforceable contract term.

Trademarks

U.S. trademark rights accrue to the party actually using a mark in connection with commercial activity to designate the source of goods and/or services.  For instance, a marketing firm creating a brand strategy and identifying a proposed mark for a client would not obtain U.S. trademark rights because only the client business would use (or intend to use) the resultant mark in commerce.  But many other countries have first-to-register systems, which might allow a vendor to register your mark. Ownership of non-trademark rights, such as copyright, in graphical logos intended to be used as trademarks might be a little more complicated and might raise other issues too, including a potential divergence in who owns the copyright and trademark rights.

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Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.

Categories
Patents Q&A

How Can I Determine Large, Small, or Micro Entity Status for Patent Fees?

Official fees for U.S. patent applications depend on the size of the applicant(s), plus that of any licensees, affiliates, or other associated parties. There are different fee rates applied to large, small, and micro entities. What follows is an explanation of how to determine if large, small, or micro entity fees apply.

Large Entity (Undiscounted) Status

By default, all applicants are subject to large entity official fees. Large entity fees are also called undiscounted fees. A for-profit business having more than 500 employees (including employees of affiliates) is a large entity. But, really, the best way to look at undiscounted or large entity status is to say that it applies whenever any applicant does not qualify for reduced fees as a small or micro entity.

If there are multiple applicants, undiscounted (large entity) fees must be paid if any of them fail to qualify for reduced fees as a small or micro entity.

Also, an applicant is required to pay undiscounted (large entity) fees if sufficiently connected with a large entity, such as through an affiliation, assignment, obligation to assign, licensing agreement, joint ownership, or shop rights.

Small Entity Status

Qualifying as a small entity allows for discounted official fees. Small entity fees are generally forty percent (40%) or two-fifths of large entity fees. Though not all fees or surcharges are eligible for a small entity discount.

To qualify for small entity status, the applicant(s) must each be a person, small business concern (having no more than 500 employees, including those of affiliates), or nonprofit organization (including non-profit universities and certain non-profit scientific or educational organizations).  But an applicant is required to pay undiscounted (large entity) fees if associated with an entity that does not qualify as a small entity, such as through an affiliation (a potentially confusing circumstance explained further below), assignment, obligation to assign, licensing agreement (subject to certain exceptions discussed below), joint ownership, or shop rights

In general, entities are affiliates when one has the power to control the other or a third party has power to control both. However, affiliation under that standard is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances. For instance, an affiliation with a single shareholder (or a group of shareholders) holding less than 50% of the voting stock can be present if that minority block of stock is large compared to other outstanding blocks of voting stock and provides “negative control” through veto power over an important aspect of the business concern. Accordingly, an affiliation with a venture capital firm or the like having sufficient control over a portfolio of multiple companies can mean that employees of all affiliate companies in that portfolio are aggregated together when assessing the 500-employee limit. As another example, an affiliation can be established when one firm relies on a second firm (including a customer) for 70% or more of its revenue in a longstanding relationship, due to economic dependence, meaning the employees of the second firm are counted against the total of the first firm. Contractual relationships short of ownership are also considered.

There are certain exceptions to the types of licenses that result in loss of small entity status. Firstly, a license or similar transfer of rights in the invention is only relevant if it involves a U.S. application or patent. A license involving only a related foreign application or patent would not affect U.S. small entity size status, for instance. Moreover, implied licenses to use and resell patented articles purchased from a small entity will not preclude the proper claiming of small entity status. Also, a use license to the U.S. Federal Government does not result in loss of small entity status.

A security interest (such as using a patent or application as collateral for a loan) does not result in loss of small entity status unless there is a default that triggers the security interest. An inventor or applicant retaining a firm to build a prototype of an invention for the applicant’s own use is not considered to constitute a license for purposes of the small entity definition.

Small entity status requires claiming that status, such as on an Application Data Sheet (ADS). However, there is no further certification or supporting evidence required.

If small entity status is lost, the applicant must submit a notification of a loss of entitlement to small entity status. However, once small entity status has been established, fees can continue to be paid at the small entity rate without regard to the change in status until the issue fee is due or any maintenance fee is due.  In other words, an established small entity fee status remains in effect during ongoing examination of an application and discounted small entity fee rates are only formally lost at the time of issue fee payment (after allowance) or when the next patent maintenance fee is due.  

Any attempt to intentionally establish inaccurate status as a small entity, or pay fees as a small entity, is considered fraud on the USPTO. Such fraud can make a resultant patent unenforceable. Also, the USPTO can assess a fine—even after a patent has issued—of no less than three (3) times the amount that was unpaid due to a false certification of small entity status.

It may be possible to correct errors related to payments at the small entity rate. If small entity status is established and small entity fees are paid in good faith, and it is later discovered that small entity status was established in error or through error the USPTO was not notified of a loss of small entity status, the error will be excused upon compliance with separate submission and itemization requirements plus a fee deficiency payment. The deficiency amount owed is calculated using rates in effect on the date upon which the deficiency is paid, not the fee rates at the time of the original (but deficient) payment. There is no time limit for such corrections.

A refund is possible, for fees timely paid in full (that is, at the undiscounted large entity rate) prior to establishing small entity status. However, such refund requests must be made within three months of the date of the timely payment of the full fee. Yet the costs and burdens associated with requesting such refunds may exceed the value of the refund in many cases.

Micro Entity Status

There are two possible bases for micro entity status: gross income basis and institution of higher education basis. The requirements for each are rather confusing. Micro entity compliance requirements are also more burdensome than for small entity status. Micro entity fees are generally half (50%) of small entity fees and a fifth (20%) of large entity fees. Though not every official fee/surcharge is eligible for a micro entity discount.

Micro Entity---Gross Income Basis Certification Form PTO/SB/15A
Micro Entity—Gross Income Basis Certification Form PTO/SB/15A

To qualify for micro entity status—gross income basis, the applicant(s) must each certify the following:

(i) the applicant qualifies as a small entity

(ii) no applicant or inventor has been named as an inventor on more than four previously filed U.S. non-provisional patent applications (including PCT applications designating the U.S.)

(iii) no applicant or inventor had a gross income in the previous year of more than the “Maximum Qualifying Gross Income,” which is three times the median household income (as of September 12, 2023 that was $223,740 (USD) but that amount changes yearly), and

(iv) no applicant or inventor has assigned, granted, or conveyed, or is under an obligation to assign, grant, or convey, a license or other ownership interest to another entity that does not meet the “Maximum Qualifying Gross Income” limit.  

For the previously filed application limit, applications resulting from prior employment are not counted against the total. So an applicant/inventor is not considered to be named on a previously-filed application for micro entity status purposes if he or she has assigned, or is under an obligation by contract or law to assign, all ownership rights in the application as the result of his or her previous employment—this exception does not apply to prior applications as part of current employment, however. Also excluded from the total are any PCT applications for which the basic national phase entry fee to enter the U.S. was not paid. Lastly, USPTO guidelines say that the filing of a future application will not jeopardize entitlement to micro entity status in any of the (up to five) applications already filed.

Income in a foreign currency must be converted to U.S. dollars using Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exchange rates.   

To qualify for micro entity status—institution of higher education basis, the applicant(s) must each qualify as a small entity and certify micro-entity status. But there are two possibilities. Each micro entity applicant (that qualifies as a small entity) must either:

(A) obtain the majority of their income from a United States institution of higher education; or

(B)  have assigned, granted, or conveyed, or be under an obligation by contract or law to assign, grant, or convey an ownership interest in the application to such a United States institution of higher education.

Micro Entity---Institution of Higher Education Basis Certification Form PTO/SB/15B
Micro Entity—Institution of Higher Education Basis Certification Form PTO/SB/15B

Importantly, the institution of higher education basis for micro entity status also requires that the inventor(s) be the applicant(s), not the university.

Both possibilities for micro entity status require that all applicant(s) qualify as a small entity. Small entity status might be lost if there is a license granted to a large entity, for example. However, the micro entity requirements do not exclude licenses for U.S. Federal Government use, meaning that an exception allowing certain applicants to qualify for small entity status does not apply for micro entity status. Also, the micro entity regulations do not explicitly refer to security interests, making it unclear if they are treated the same as for small entity status.

All applicants must still be entitled to micro entity status to pay a fee in the micro entity amount at the time of any official payments. Written certification is required to initially establish micro entity status. But more is required after establishing that status. It is further necessary to determine whether the requirements for micro entity status exist at the time each fee payment is made. Also, if the prosecution of an application under the gross income basis status extends across multiple calendar years, each applicant, inventor, and joint inventor must verify that the gross income limit for the requisite calendar year is met to maintain eligibility for the micro entity—gross income basis discount. And under the institution of higher education basis, each applicant, inventor, and joint inventor potentially must verify that a majority of his or her income comes from a U.S. institution of higher education. These requirements make micro entity status compliance more onerous than for small entity status. Unlike with small entity status, micro entity status can be lost during ongoing examination of an application.

Whenever micro entity status is lost, it is necessary to file a formal notification of loss of entitlement to micro entity status. As explained above, loss of micro entity status can potentially occur at any time. So a notification of loss of micro entity status can generally not be deferred and must be filed promptly (and before any official payments) when an applicant or inventor’s status changes. Small entity status may or may not still be available if micro entity status is lost.

Any attempt to intentionally establish incorrect status as a micro entity, or pay fees as a micro entity, is considered fraud. Such fraud can make a resultant patent unenforceable. Also, the USPTO can assess a fine—even after a patent has issued—of no less than three (3) times the amount that was unpaid due to a false certification of micro entity status.

It may be possible to correct errors related to payments at the micro entity rate. If micro entity status is established and micro entity fees are paid in good faith, and it is later discovered that micro entity status was established in error or through error the USPTO was not notified of a loss of micro entity status, the error will be excused upon compliance with separate submission and itemization requirements plus the fee deficiency payment. The deficiency amount owed is calculated using the date on which the deficiency is belatedly paid, not the fee rates at the time of the original (but deficient) payment.

There is no possibility for refunds of previously-paid fees based on later establishment of micro entity status. In this respect, micro entity status does not provide a window for requesting a refund of previously-paid fees as is possible for subsequent establishment of small entity status. Although if the fees were originally paid at a large entity rate a refund of the difference between undiscounted and small entity rates may be possible when micro entity status is establish, because micro entity status requires that the applicant also qualify as a small entity.

Photo of Austen Zuege

Austen Zuege is an attorney at law and registered U.S. patent attorney in Minneapolis whose practice encompasses patents, trademarks, copyrights, domain name cybersquatting, IP agreements and licensing, freedom-to-operate studies, client counseling, and IP litigation. If you have patent, trademark, or other IP issues, he can help.